Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature

By Paul M. Healy, K. Palepu. 2001

7,390 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2fde20d0e515560b15a821902511404b720a3d70

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Citations in the corpus

The influence of corporate social responsibility disclosure on share prices: Evidence from the United Kingdom (2015, background): “Shareholders who do not have the relevant information when valuing shares will assume the worst-case scenario and lower the price they are prepared to pay for shares in the company (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Cormier et al., 2005).”
Mitigating information asymmetry through sustainability assurance: The role of accountants and levels of assurance (2017, background): “In this agency context, firms can combat market frictions by increasing corporate disclosure, thus inducing the optimal functioning of an efficient capital market (Healy & Palepu, 2001).”
Does Information Risk Really Matter? An Analysis of the Determinants and Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting Quality (2008, neutral): “(2007) and Hughes et al. (2007) who argue that the information quality effect in the Easley and O’Hara (2004) model is a diversifiable phenomenon and should not affect risk premiums in large economies.”
Does Chatter Really Matter? Dynamics of User-Generated Content and Stock Performance (2012, background): “…of UGC to Investors Although ﬁrms provide information to investors through ﬁnancial statements and other disclosures, numerous studies have shown the existence of asymmetric information between ﬁrms (e.g., managers) and investors, resulting in capital market imperfections (Healy and Palepu 2001).”
Management Earnings Forecasts: A Review and Framework (2008, neutral): “Recent survey evidence by Graham et al. ͑2005͒ confirms that managers issue voluntary disclosures, including earnings forecasts, to develop and maintain a reputation for accurate and transparent reporting ͑also see Skinner 1994; Stocken 2000; Healy and Palepu 2001͒.”
Soft information in earnings announcements: news or noise? (2008, result): “Our assumption is supported by, e.g., Core (2001) who concludes in his review of the voluntary disclosure literature that financial analysts provide useful information, and similarly by the findings of Bushee, Core, Guay and Hamm (2010) which suggest that the press helps to reduce information…”
The Determinants of Voluntary Financial Disclosure by Nonprofit Organizations (2012, methodology): “…research has shown that, in making the disclosure decision, managers consider competing organizations’ relative levels of openness as well as the risks from disclosing information (e.g., profitability) that current and/or potential competitors might use to their advantage (Healy & Palepu, 2001).”
Quality of Financial Reporting Choice: Determinants and Economic Consequences (2003, positive): “Firms have incentives to respond to investors’ demands for firm-specific information since reducing information asymmetries between the firm and its investors can lower their cost of capital (see the survey articles by Healy and Palepu [2001] and Verrecchia [2001]). External demands for firm-specifi”
International Financial Reporting Standards and the quality of financial statement information (2010, background): “This would therefore tend to reduce the related agency costs that might otherwise arise (Bushman & Smith, 2001; Healy & Palepu, 2001), and would in turn tend to lead to an appreciation in stock returns, which might be unrelated to firm current financial performance (Gelb & Zarowin, 2002).”
Are All Analysts Created Equal? Industry Expertise and Monitoring Effectiveness of Financial Analysts (2017, neutral): “They can also provide external monitoring as an information intermediary by gathering, analyzing, and disseminating more firm-related information to enhance corporate transparency and help expose managerial misbehavior (Healy and Palepu (2001)).”
The impact of voluntary disclosure on cost of equity capital estimates in a temporal setting (2007, methodology): “Different approaches have included utilising proxies for COEC at first (e.g. bid-ask spreads; see Healy and Palepu, 2001; Welker, 1995), which are directly observable, but might not relate to COEC at all.”