Management Earnings Forecasts: A Review and Framework

By D. Hirst, L. Koonce, Shankar Venkataraman. 2008

573 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/22c8d19d54a5e3ca6fb0a74fed7275aadff2cbd2

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Citations in the corpus

Not Only What but Also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure (2014, unknown): “So, in our setting equation (8) can be written as”
Societal Trust and Management Earnings Forecasts (2020, methodology): “…research has examined the determinants, characteristics, and consequences of management earnings forecasts using U.S. data (Healy and Palepu 2001; Hirst et al. 2008; Beyer Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3535172 6 et al. 2010), few studies have investigated the…”
Management Forecast Quality and Capital Investment Decisions (2014, unknown): “To assess the quality of management earnings forecasts, we focus on forecast accuracy following prior literature (Baik et al. 2011; Bamber et al. 2010; Feng et al. 2009; Hirst et al. 2008).”
Forward-Looking MD&A Disclosures and the Information Environment (2015, unknown): “8 In their review of the voluntary disclosure literature, Hirst et al. (2008) write: “Managers often issue earnings forecasts to correct information asymmetry problems and, thus, influence their stock price (e.”
Managerial Incentives and Management Forecast Precision (2013, background): “the forecasts and the importance of such characteristics as forecast precision and horizon to market reactions, it is not well understood how managers’ incentives affect these characteristics (Hirst et al. 2008).”
What’s My Style? The Influence of Top Managers on Voluntary Corporate Financial Disclosure (2010, unknown): “…focuses on properties of one of the most important and widely investigated forms of voluntary financial disclosure—management earnings forecasts—that Hirst et al. 2008, 315 characterize as “one of the key voluntary disclosure mechanisms by which managers establish or alter market earnings…”
CEO Overconfidence and Management Forecasting (2016, unknown): “As Hirst, Koonce, and Venkataraman (2008) conclude in their review of the literature on management forecasts: “…managers’ choice of forecast characteristics appears to be the least understood (both in terms of theory and research) even though it is the component over which managers have the most…”
The Association Between Management Earnings Forecast Errors and Accruals (2009, background): “Prior research has proposed that management earnings forecasts, by revealing managers’ superior private information, help reduce information asymmetry, preempt costly shareholder litigation, and enhance corporate reputation for transparent financial reporting (Hirst et al. 2008).”
The Economics of Disclosure and Financial Reporting Regulation: Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research (2015, unknown): “For instance, for managerial earnings forecasts, we can measure precision and bias (see Hirst et al., 2008, for a review).”
Employee Ownership and Firm Disclosure (2015, background): “See Kedia and Rajgopal (2009).”