The Determinants of Executive Compensation in Family-Controlled Public Corporations

By Luis R. Gómez-Mejía, Martín Larraza-Kintana, Marianna Makri. 2003

834 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2fa610076d17b559aaff9566b438ac1381d0d2ca

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Citations in the corpus

Nonfamily Managers, Family Firms, and the Winner's Curse: The Influence of Noneconomic Goals and Bounded Rationality (2014, background): “Put differently, if a family firm could hire a family or nonfamily manager for the same compensation, the latter would need to perform at a higher level for the family owner to obtain comparable utility, owing to the cost associated with sacrificing noneconomic goals.”
Does family business excel in firm performance? An institution-based view (2012, methodology): “Prior studies have used different ways to define the “family business” concept, including family ownership, voting control, involvement in management, control of the board, intention for family succession, or a self-perception of being a family business (Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2005; Chua et al., ”
Value Is in the Eye of the Owner (2012, background): “, 2001); lower family CEO salary in exchange for job security and emotional attachment (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003); maintaining control over the firm, which engenders risk taking or creative earnings management to assure SEW (Gomez-Mejia et al.”
How to Pay Nonfamily Managers in Large Family Firms: A Principal—Agent Model (2011, neutral): “Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003) also find that the positive effect of R&D intensity on the share of long-term income in CEO pay is stronger for nonfamily CEOs than for family CEOs.”
Diversification Decisions in Family-Controlled Firms (2010, neutral): “In the specific case of family ownership, public corporations that meet the criteria used here differ significantly from those that do not along several key dimensions including executive compensation and succession practices ( Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003 ), business strategies (Daily & Dollinger, 1991”
Family Control and Family Firm Valuation by Family CEOs: The Importance of Intentions for Transgenerational Control (2012, background): “On the other hand, the talents of family managers might instead be discounted by the external labor market (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2003, Wu et al. 2004) because of an inability to ascertain the mix of performance and family ties that gave them their positions .”
Socioemotional Wealth and Business Risks in Family-controlled Firms: Evidence from Spanish Olive Oil Mills (2007, background): “By contrast, as documented by Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, and Makri (2003), the typical large family firm in North America tends to be rather heterogeneous in its ownership structure, often involving institutional investors, banks, and non-family owners, all of whom are residual risk bearers and…”
Are Family Firms Really More Socially Responsible? (2014, methodology): “Based on previous studies (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2003), we classified the company as a family firm if two criteria were met: (1) an individual or a family group owned at least 20% of the shares during the whole period 2001–2010.”