What Do Entrepreneurs Pay for Venture Capital Affiliation

By David H. Hsu. 2004

1,279 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Management of Technology and Innovation

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2d95f5ae3d6a88e74fa86da88a3a673c5fdc3325

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In Management of Technology and Innovation

Citations in the corpus

Local Bias in Venture Capital Investments (2010, positive): “First, there is a two-sided matching in VC finance whereby the VCs must select the entrepreneurs and likewise the entrepreneurs must also select the VCs (Wright and Lockett, 2003; Hsu, 2004; Engel and Keilbach, 2006; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2006; Franke et al., 2006; Mäkelä and Maula, 2007).”
Foundations of High Impact Entrepreneurship (2008, background): “…clear picture of the venture capitalist as an active investor who assumes a monitoring role for the innovative entrepreneurial firm (Sapienza and Gupta 1994; Lerner 1995) and uses specialized knowledge to add value to venture-backed firms (Sapienza and Manigart 1996; Gifford 1997; Hsu, 2004, 2006).”
How much prestige is enough? Assessing the value of multiple types of high-status affiliates for young firms (2010, background): “To the extent that prestigious affiliates exact a toll for their participation (Chen et al., 2008; Hsu, 2004), the questions for the IPO firm are clear: What kinds of, and how much, prestige are enough?”
The diminishing signaling value of patents between early rounds of venture capital financing (2014, background): “that VCFs with stronger reputation typically receive larger equity than investors with weaker reputation for the similar investment (Hsu, 2004).”
What signals matter for social startups? It depends: The influence of gender role congruity on social impact accelerator selection decisions (2019, background): “Second, an equity investment signals that the venture will have access to the equity investor’s superior resources, capabilities, and networks, all of which should enhance its prospects for scale and survival (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Hsu, 2004; Stuart et al., 1999).”
Signals across multiple networks: : how venture capital and alliance networks affect interorganizational collaboration. (2013, background): “This variable, VC deal size, is measured as the number of a VCs’ portfolio companies (Gompers & Lerner, 2000; Hsu, 2004).”
The throne vs. the kingdom: Founder control and value creation in startups (2017, background): “8 Founders are more willing to take weaker investment terms—most centrally, terms that affect these control rights—from venture capitalists than from other investors, such as angel investors (Hsu, 2004).”
The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: Determinants of Success and Failure (2013, background): “…funding, especially as the rules around crowdfunding for equity are evolving (see, for example, the JOBS Act, 112th Congress), and early stage investors typically offer much more to new ventures than simply funding – including advice, governance, and prestige (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Hsu, 2004).”
A Signaling Theory of Acquisition Premiums: Evidence from IPO Targets (2012, background): “…of the firm’s quality (e.g., Carter & Manaster, 1990; Higgins & Gulati, 2003) and that backing by a prominent venture capitalist (VC) is another important signal, given the selectivity with which such VCs make investments and the costs borne by firms (e.g., Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Hsu, 2004, 2006).”
A Review and Road Map of Entrepreneurial Equity Financing Research: Venture Capital, Corporate Venture Capital, Angel Investment, Crowdfunding, and Accelerators (2017, background): “Moreover, in selecting venture capitalists, it has been shown that entrepreneurs are willing to pay a premium to partner with more reputable venture capitalists by way of a discounted valuation (Hsu, 2004).”