Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) Support for Dynamic Memory Management Inside an Enclave
By Francis X. McKeen, Ilya Alexandrovich, Ittai Anati, Dror Caspi, Simon Johnson, Rebekah Leslie-Hurd, Carlos V. Rozas. HASP@ISCA, 2016
347 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Hardware and Architecture
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/01d1575116b8aaacde1fd0e164a932b1ceffa04d
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Daniel Gruss
- Michael Schwarz
- Moritz Lipp
- Yuval Yarom
- Stefan Mangard
- Clémentine Maurice
- Daniel Genkin
- Bo Li
In Computer Networks and Communications
- Nikola Konstantinov
- Christoph H. Lampert
- Bo Li
- Dong Su
- Michael Schwarz
- Stefano Secci
- Guy Pujolle
- Stefan Mangard
In Hardware and Architecture
- Bo Li
- Nikola Konstantinov
- Stefano Secci
- Guy Pujolle
- Stefan Mangard
- Daniel Gruss
- Daniel Genkin
- Clémentine Maurice
Citations in the corpus
- This Paper Is Included in the Proceedings of the 12th Usenix Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (osdi '16). Ryoan: a Distributed Sandbox for Untrusted Computation on Secret Data Ryoan: a Distributed Sandbox for Untrusted Computation on Secret Data (neutral): “Unfortunately, version 2 of SGX also imposes additional synchronization (via extended behaviors of ETRACK) when modifying enclave page state [66].”
- Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks (2017, methodology): “Intel introduced a new hardware extension SGX (Software Guard Extensions) [5] in their CPUs, starting with the Skylake microarchitecture.”
- Trustworthy AI: From Principles to Practices (2021, methodology): “The Intel Software Guard Extensions implement the TEE by hardware-based memory encryption [240].”
- YerbaBuena: Securing Deep Learning Inference Data via Enclave-based Ternary Model Partitioning (2018, background): “We can also find the technical details about the SGX attestation and sealing mechanisms in [1], dynamic memory allocation of SGX2 in [34], andMemory Encryption Engine in [15].”
- Another Flip in the Wall of Rowhammer Defenses (2017, background): “While Intel does not claim to protect against side-channel attacks that deduce information of collected power statistics, performance statistics, branch statistics, or information on pages accessed via page tables [4], several such attacks have been demonstrated.”
- Robust Learning from Untrusted Sources (2019, methodology): “If necessary, the computational protocol can be executed via a trusted computation method (Chen et al., 2009), for example by using Software Guard Extensions (SGX extensions) (McKeen et al., 2016), to ensure the correctness of the procedure.”
- A Vademecum on Blockchain Technologies: When, Which, and How (2019, background): “Security of those systems particularly depends on a trusted computing base that is running within specific hardware such as Intel SGX [137] and ARM TrustZone [174].”