Towards Reconciling Transaction Cost Economics and the Knowledge-based View of the Firm: The Context of Interfirm Collaborations

By Bruce Arthur Heiman, Jack A. Nickerson. 2002

154 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2ca44bcc732088ff1c32572e90d494a08315433a

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In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

Opportunity Discovery, Problem Solving and the Entrepreneurial Theory of the Firm (2007, background): “Heiman and Nickerson (2002, 2004) identify attributes of the context for solving problems such as knowledge dispersion – in how many individuals does the relevant knowledge sets reside – and tacit knowledge, which impacts the costs of sharing knowledge.”
The Economics of Hybrid Organizations (2004, background): “NORTH [1981], [1990], [1991] has repeatedly insisted on the importance of the rules of the game for understanding how actors play that game, choosing ways to organize transactions. WILLIAMSON [1991] went a step further, as far as the micro level is concerned, in introducing the possibility of shifts”
The end of the opportunism vs trust debate: Bounded reliability as a new envelope concept in research on MNE governance (2009, background): “Management and IB scholars have mostly chosen to reject (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996), incrementally extend (Heiman & Nickerson, 2002), ignore (Conner & Prahalad, 1996), or view as relevant in only well-defined circumstances (Casson, 2000; Madhok, 2006a; Verbeke, 2003), Williamson’s strong-form view of…”
A Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm - The Problem-Solving Perspective (2004, background): “Kauffman’s NK model provides a simple mathematical construction that arguably provides one parameterization of Simon’s characterization. Like Levinthal (1997), these two parameters in our framework combine to describe a solution landscape. We develop our discussion implicitly assuming that N is nont”
Blockchain Governance—A New Way of Organizing Collaborations? (2020, unknown): “Whereas verification is relatively straightforward when the transaction attributes are clearly understood, a highly tacit transaction is typicallymuch more difficult to verify (Heiman and Nickerson 2002).”
Strategic Alliance Outcomes: A Transaction-Cost Economics Perspective (2006, unknown): “Lastly, Heiman and Nickerson (2002) conceptually argue that when equity ownership is shared mutually, then knowledge transfer should be improved.”
The Choice of Organizational Governance Form and Performance: Predictions from Transaction Cost, Resource-based, and Real Options Theories (2003, background): “Heiman and Nickerson (2002)have begun to develop logic consistent with this approach.”
Friends, Acquaintances, or Strangers? Partner Selection in R&D Alliances (2008, methodology): “Recent research by Heiman and Nickerson (2002; 2004) also found that equity-based governance is typically adopted to deal with the potential opportunistic behaviors resulting from knowledge management practices that are designed to facilitate the transfer of tacit knowledge between partners.”