Auctioning of EU ETS phase II allowances: how and why?

By Cameron Hepburn, Michael Grubb, Karsten Neuhoff, F. Matthes, Max Tse. 2006

314 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/16cca38d5ecb387f7ca9830d60002a3fa911b01c

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Citations in the corpus

Research on carbon market price mechanism and influencing factors: a literature review (2018, background): “Hepburn et al. (2006) agreed that the 10% quotas auction issued in phase II would restrain price fluctuations during 2008–2012 and provide long-term price signals support in the following time.”
EU Emission Allowances and the Stock Market: Evidence from the Electricity Industry (2009, background): “…Free allocation can act as a temporary subsidy to support firm balance sheets, which may be justified for sectors to which production cost increases as indicated by EUA price rises may not be passed on to the consumers particularly due to international competition (Hepburn et al., 2006).”
Price Floors for Emissions Trading (2010, unknown): “A reserve price applies when permits are auctioned, again limiting the amount of permits available to emitters (Grubb and Neuhoff, 2006; Hepburn et al., 2006).”
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results (2007, background): “10For a typical example in the context of the EU ETS, see Hepburn et al. (2006).”
Understanding policy change: Multiple streams and emissions trading in Germany (2008, background): “Thus, auctioning could make the allocation process more transparent and efficient ( Hepburn et al., 2006 ).”
Emissions trading: lessons learnt from the 1st phase of the EU ETS and prospects for the 2nd phase (2006, background): “This also raises the possibility of sufficient auction volumes to enable a coordinated minimum auction reserve price in phase II, which could bring big benefits in terms of increased price security (Hepburn et al., 2006).”
The effects of climate policy on the rate and direction of innovation: a survey of the EU ETS and the electricity sector (2012, background): “The auctioning of emission rights, as provided for in the power sector from 2013 onwards (ETS 3), is one way of better incentivising investments in non-emitting technologies (Hepburn et al., 2006).”
Why does emissions trading under the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) not affect firms’ competitiveness? Empirical findings from the literature (2018, background): “In consequence, the system could lack liquidity, and thus a proper price signal (Hepburn et al., 2006).”
Trade, climate change, and the political game theory of border carbon adjustments (2012, background): “Properly crafted BCAs could help reduce trade distortions, limit 5 See Evenett and Whalley (2009) for an overview of “green protectionism”, one form of “murky protectionism”.”
Decentralization in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and Lessons for Global Policy (2007, unknown): “Others have advocated an increased use of auctions across the EU ( Hepburn et al. 2006 ).”
Border adjustment for European emissions trading: Competitiveness and carbon leakage (2010, background): “If importers would be required to buy allowances, it could be conceived as unfair competition if domestic firms would get their allowances for free through grandfathering (Hepburn et al., 2006).”
Carbon Markets and Technological Innovation (2010, unknown): “The price ﬂoor can be implemented with a reservation price for allowance auctions (Hepburn et al. 2006), by governments issuing option contracts on the carbon price (Ismer and Neuhoﬀ 2006) as a commitment to buy back permits as the carbon price drops below the price ﬂoor.”