Investor Protection and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Worldwide Ceo Turnover

By Mark L. Defond, Mingyi Hung. 2004

404 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/274e898fd2a56554b01180e35b9e28f7c54ff763

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Finance

Citations in the corpus

An institution-based view of executive compensation: A multilevel meta-analytic test (2012, background): “…investors, and blockholders with leverage to initiate governance changes such as installing independent compensation committees, increasing the proportion of long-term incentives, lowering overall compensation levels, and effectuating executive turnover (David et al., 1998; Defond & Hung, 2004).”
Does Takeover Activity Cause Managerial Discipline? Evidence from International M&A Laws (2015, neutral): “, DeFond and Hung (2004), Huson et al.”
Earnings Management and Audit Quality in Europe: Evidence from the Private Client Segment Market (2008, background): “7Similar to DeFond and Hung (2004) we define investor protection as ‘the extent of laws that protect investors’ rights and the strength of the legal institutions that facilitate law enforcement’.”
Minority Shareholders’ Control Rights and the Quality of Corporate Decisions in Weak Investor Protection Countries: A Natural Experiment from China (2013, background): “However, due to poor legal enforcement, many traditional investor protection provisions such as board independence are not very effective in reducing insiders’ agency problems (DeFond and Hung 2004).”
The Role of International Financial Reporting Standards in Accounting Quality: Evidence from the European Union (2010, background): “, 2008), and the effectiveness of regulation depends largely on proper enforcement (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; DeFond and Hung, 2004; Tang et al., 2008).”
The Influence of Analysts, Institutional Investors, and Insiders on the Incorporation of Market, Industry, and Firm-Specific Information into Stock Prices (2004, neutral): “DeFond and Hung [2003] show that the association between lagged stock returns (lagged earnings) and subsequent CEO turnover is stronger in countries with low (high) stock return synchronicity, consistent with investors using external, observable stock prices for governance purposes when returns reli”
Corporate governance in the 2007–2008 financial crisis: Evidence from financial institutions worldwide (2012, methodology): “Following Weisbach (1988) and DeFond and Hung (2004), we examine this conjecture by estimating a logit model of CEO turnover on stock returns and an interaction term with a dummy variable indicating if firm is in the financial sector.”
Institutional Antecedents of Corporate Governance Legitimacy (2008, background): “…leaders possess a mind-set of invulnerability (Wicks, 2001), the greater the level of investor protections (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000), the higher the CEO turnover (Nagar, 2004), and the larger the financial institutions (D. Li, Moshirian, Pham, & Zein, 2006).”