The Trouble With Electricity Markets: Understanding California's Restructuring Disaster

By S. Borenstein. 2002

609 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Media Technology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/272a6ed9b577659d8bd36aafa3ef6feff24a8b9d

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In Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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Citations in the corpus

Residential implementation of critical-peak pricing of electricity (2007, background): “While factors leading up to the onset of the California electricity crisis are complex, there is reasonable consensus that the lack of real-time response by retail demand was a major contributor to its severity and duration (Borenstein, 2002; Jurewitz, 2002; Woo, 2001; Woo et al., 2003).”
Competition in Electricity Markets with Renewable Energy Sources (2017, background): “Generally, there are two ways of modeling energy markets (Joskow (2001), Borenstein (2002)): pooling market and bilateral trades.”
A survey on electricity market design: Insights from theory and real-world implementations of capacity remuneration mechanisms (2019, background): “The electricity sector is characterized by a particular set of features distinguishing it from other sectors often viewed as unique and problematic as these features act as barriers complicating the formation of an efficient market equilibrium between demand and supply in the short term and, even mo”
Electricity consumption, employment and real income in Australia evidence from multivariate Granger causality tests (2005, background): “generation resulting from the failure of regulatory reform is regarded as one of the main causes of the California electricity crisis (Borenstein, 2002). Sparked by fears of what happened in California and acting in response to a Victoria Security of Electricity Taskforce Report (2000), in 2000–2001”
Rethinking Real Time Electricity Pricing (2011, neutral): “+ n 1(phs p s ) + 2(phd phs) + 3HP aft d + 4HPd + 5 o Xi + hd + "ihd (9)”
Oligopoly equilibria in electricity contract markets (2005, methodology): “substituting (2) into the first order condition for firm i we have a− 3 qi − q i ́ − na+ j 6=i q f j +q f i −nbk (n+1+bc) b = K + cqi”
What changes energy consumption? Prices and public pressures (2008, background): “For a more complete discussion, see Borenstein (2002), Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak (2002), Joskow and Kahn (2002), or Wolak (2005).”
Power TAC: A competitive economic simulation of the smart grid (2013, background): “Unfortunately, it can be difficult to introduce creative and dynamic pricing schemes when energy is produced and sold by regulated monopolies, and transitions to competitive markets can be risky (Borenstein, 2002).”
Markets for Power in the United States: An Interim Assessment (2006, positive): “It arises as a consequence of transmission constraints that limit the geographic expanse of competition, generation ownership concentration within constrained import areas, the non-storability of electricity, and the very low elasticity of demand for electricity (Joskow (1997), Borenstein (2002)). G”
Evaluating the Impacts of Real-Time Pricing on the Usage of Wind Generation (2009, background): “Borenstein (2007) discusses the use of hedging instruments by a utility to insulate customers from most of this price risk, but subjecting them to marginal rates based on RTP to reap the efficiency gains.”
The U.S. Electricity Industry After 20 Years of Restructuring (2015, background): “7In Borenstein and Bushnell (2000), we pointed out this tension between efficient economic decision making and incentives for rent shifting.”
Dynamic electricity pricing - Which programs do consumers prefer? (2013, neutral): “The most dynamic program is real-time-pricing (RTP), where prices follow market prices more closely, e.g. on an hourly basis (Borenstein 2002).”