Outside monitoring and CEO compensation in the banking industry
By Kose John, Hamid Mehran, Yiming Qian. 2010
162 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2550fe6134b9d7f6e314e286d1a15ce8562bfe71
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Collins G. Ntim
- Jens Hagendorff
- Francesco Vallascas
- Huasheng Gao
- Kai Li
- Gary Gang Tian
- Kofi A. Osei
- Xiaofei Pan
In Finance
- Huasheng Gao
- Kai Li
- Francesco Vallascas
- Gary Gang Tian
- Xiaofei Pan
- Dennis Thomas
- Jens Hagendorff
- Collins G. Ntim
Citations in the corpus
- Disproportional Ownership Structure and Pay-Performance Relationship: Evidence from China's Listed Firms (2011, methodology): “Through a pyramid structure, cross-shareholding, and dual-class stocks, the largest shareholder’s control rights were always in excess of their cash flow rights (La Porta et al., 1999). Therefore, in further tests, we replace cash flow rights with excess control rights, defined as the difference bet”
- CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF BANKS: A SURVEY (2016, unknown): “Based on data for 143 BHCs from 1993 till 2007, John et al. (2010) show that pay-for-performance sensitivity of bank CEO compensation is negatively related to the leverag ratio and positively related to monitoring intensity by a bank supervisor and subordinated debt holders.”
- Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance: A Simultaneous Equation Approach (2015, methodology): “JEL Classification: G32; G34; G38 Keywords: Executive compensation; Corporate performance; Corporate governance; Simultaneous equation; Generalised method of moments (GMM); Endogeneity”
- A Comparison of CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity in Privately-Held and Public Firms (2015, background): “Privately-held firms often have illiquid concentrated ownership that encourages shareholders to actively monitor managerial actions (Kahn and Winton (1998), Maug (1998), and Ke, Petroni, and Safieddine (1999)).”
- CEO pay incentives and risk-taking: Evidence from bank acquisitions (2011, methodology): “We follow John et al. (2010) and define pre-merger LEVERAGE of the bidding bank as 1 minus the equity-to-assets ratio.”