Monitoring, Financial Distress, and the Structure of Commercial Lending Syndicates

By Sang Whi Lee, Donald J. Mullineaux. 2004

295 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/22c9822f5e389f0573b41d5681446f65b5b1afd4

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Citations in the corpus

Syndication, Interconnectedness, and Systemic Risk (2018, unknown): “, Jones, Lang and Nigro [31], Lee and Mullineaux [32], and Sufi [38]), lenders’reputation (e.”
Asymmetric Information Effects on Loan Spreads (2009, background): “Several previous papers have looked at the determinants of the lending syndicate, including Simons (1993), Preece and Mullineaux (1996), Dennis and Mullineaux (2000), Jones, Lang, and Nigro (2000), Lee and Mullineaux (2004), Panyagometh and Roberts (2002), Esty and Megginson (2003), and Sufi (2007).”
Large debt financing: syndicated loans versus corporate bonds (2010, unknown): “…Dennis and Mullineaux 2000; Altunbaş, Gadanecz, and Kara 2005) and the impact of information asymmetries on the formation of the syndicate structure (Jones, Lang, and Nigro 2000; Bradley and Roberts 2003; Esty and Megginson 2003; Lee and Mullineaux 2004; Mullineaux and Pyles 2004; Sufi 2007).8”
Insider Trading in Credit Derivatives (2005, unknown): “So it is worthwhile to 19See Sufi (2004), although his finding here is at odds with Lee and Mullineaux (2004). ask whether credit risk is the driving factor behind our bank effect.”
Creditor Concentration: An Empirical Investigation (2012, unknown): “In Minetti (2007) for example banks that have only limited capital reduce their lending to discipline the borrowers.”
Financial Crises and the Composition of Cross-Border Lending (2014, unknown): “As a result, lead banks tend to hold greater portions of the loans on their books as a signal of loan screening and monitoring (Sufi, 2007; Lee and Mullineaux, 2004).”
The role of information asymmetry and financial reporting quality in debt trading: Evidence from the secondary loan market $ (2008, unknown): “A number of studies find that the arranger holds larger proportions of informationally problematic and riskier loans in its own portfolio (Simons, 1993; Lee and Mullineaux, 2004; Jones et al., 2005; Sufi, 2007a). In addition, the arranger has been found to syndicate a larger proportion of a loan tha”
Internal knowledge development and external knowledge access in venture capital investment performance (2008, unknown): “More generally, alliance literature suggests that the costs of inter-firm collaboration increase substantially with more external partners (Artz and Brush, 2000; Meuleman, 2006; Parkhe, 1993) because of the need to monitor opportunistic behaviour and the lack of proper coordination when the rules us”
The Pricing Effect of Certification on Syndicated Loans (2008, unknown): “The share retained is also smaller when arrangers have stronger links with the borrower or better reputation (Dennis and Mullineaux, 1994 and 2000; Lee and Mullineaux, 2004) and in countries where creditor rights and legal enforcement are stronger (Esty and Megginson, 2003).”
The Impact of Financial Reporting Quality on Debt Contracting: Evidence from Internal Control Weakness Reports (2011, unknown): “responsibilities (Lee and Mullineaux [2004]).”
Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans (2007, background): “13 Information asymmetry and the need for monitoring are key assumptions in early theories of banking (Leland and Pyle (1977), Diamond (1984)).”
On Loan Sales, Loan Contracting, and Lending Relationships (2009, background): “Covenants can limit potential losses by providing the loan buyer with protection against wealth expropriation by the borrower and against buying a loan that the seller either did not screen well or privately knew was poor.”