The Impact of Financial Reporting Quality on Debt Contracting: Evidence from Internal Control Weakness Reports
By Anna M. Costello, Regina Wittenberg-Moerman. 2011
506 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e66fcbdeec2317036bb9c4bccf4f673b985972ac
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Christopher S. Armstrong
- W. Guay
- Anna M. Costello
- Joseph P. Weber
- Kevin C. W. Chen
- Tai-Yuan Chen
- Lilian H. Chan
- Robert M. Bushman
In Strategy and Management
- Christopher S. Armstrong
- W. Guay
- Joseph P. Weber
- Kevin C. W. Chen
- Tai-Yuan Chen
- Lilian H. Chan
- Anna M. Costello
- David F. Larcker
Citations in the corpus
- Accounting Information in Financial Contracting: The Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective (2016, unknown): “Utilizing material internal control weaknesses (ICW) to measure accounting quality, Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) find that following ICWs, financial covenants are used less extensively in loan agreements.”
- Capital versus Performance Covenants in Debt Contracts (2012, unknown): “Third, we contribute to the literature on how accounting information affects the design of debt contracts (Frankel and Litov 2007; Ball et al. 2008; Bharath et al. 2008; Nikolaev 2010; Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman 2010; Demerjian 2007 and 2010).”
- The Information Role of Audit Opinions in Debt Contracting (2016, unknown): “We select other control variables similar to those in prior studies on the determinants of covenants in debt contracting (Beatty et al., 2002; Sufi, 2007; Graham et al., 2008; Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2011).”
- The Effects of Firm-Initiated Clawback Provisions on Bank Loan Contracting (2013, methodology): “Consistent with the notion that the use of financial covenants is increasing in the quality of accounting numbers (e.g., Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman 2011), we also observe an increase in number of accounting-based covenants in loan contracts after clawback adoption.”
- Mitigating Incentive Conflicts in Inter-Firm Relationships: Evidence from Long-Term Supply Contracts (2013, background): “For example, Ball et al. (2008) and Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) show that when financial statement reliability decreases, lenders are less likely to use contractual terms that are based on accounting numbers and substitute them with non-accounting-based monitoring mechanisms.”
- The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting (2010, background): “Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2010) extend this paper by investigating the effect of internal control weaknesses on loan covenant packages.”