On Loan Sales, Loan Contracting, and Lending Relationships
By Steven Drucker, Manju Puri. 2009
447 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8de5b363f5160bc4340ec4976ccad1bed3f7027f
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- V. Acharya
- Allen N. Berger
- Iftekhar Hasan
- Mingming Zhou
- Regina Wittenberg-Moerman
- Robert M. Bushman
- F. Ippolito
- Anna M. Costello
In Economics and Econometrics
- Allen N. Berger
- V. Acharya
- F. Ippolito
- Iftekhar Hasan
- Nadia Massoud
- Regina Wittenberg-Moerman
- Heitor Almeida
- Anthony Saunders
In Finance
- Allen N. Berger
- V. Acharya
- Mingming Zhou
- Iftekhar Hasan
- Robert M. Bushman
- Regina Wittenberg-Moerman
- Victoria Ivashina
- F. Ippolito
Citations in the corpus
- Credit Lines as Monitored Liquidity Insurance: Theory and Evidence (2012, methodology): “The first measure of covenant intensity is based on the covenant index of Drucker and Puri (2009) which is computed as the sum of all 33 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2081940 the covenants included in a loan agreement.”
- Political connections and the cost of bank loans (2014, unknown): “Due to the limitations in Dealscan’s coverage of financial covenants (Drucker and Puri, 2009), we also use EDGAR to collect the covenant information.”
- Securitization Without Adverse Selection: The Case of Clos (2012, unknown): “There is a large body of literature that looks at the mechanisms that mitigate asymmetric information associated with corporate loan sales; notably, Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), Dennis and Mullineaux (2000), Sufi (2007), Drucker and Puri (2009), and Ivashina (2009).”
- Do Hedge Funds Trade on Private Information? Evidence from Syndicated Lending and Short-Selling (2011, background): “As pointed out by Drucker and Puri (2008) and Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009), there are huge problems regarding the identification of covenants in Dealscan.”
- Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit (2009, unknown): “Second, the loan sales market provides an effective mechanism for risk diversification for banks (see, for example, Cebenoyan and Strahan (2002)), especially in light of the classic " credit paradox " .”