Asymmetric Information Effects on Loan Spreads

By Victoria Ivashina. 2009

759 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/791c6311c0c5c4d18a70b539cf014baaefd40ca8

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Citations in the corpus

A capital structure channel of monetary policy (2018, positive): “We identify lead arrangers following Sufi (2007) and Ivashina (2009).”
Trading Partners in the Interbank Lending Market (2013, background): “…examine the importance of relationships for larger and more transparent firms and show that relationship banking positively affects the terms of lending for large syndicated loans (Dahiya, Saunders and Srinivasan (2003), Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders and Srinivasan (2008, 2007), and Ivashina (2009)).”
Real Effects of the Sovereign Debt Crisis in Europe: Evidence from Syndicated Loans (2018, neutral): “Ivashina, V. (2009). Asymmetric information effects on loan spreads.”
Information Asymmetry and Financial Development Dynamics in Africa (2016, neutral): “…empirical technique is important because as we have seen in the introduction: (i) the are inherent issues of endogeneity in the modelling of IA (Ivashina, 2009) and (ii) Triki and Gajigo (2014) have also admitted in the introduction of their paper that they have failed to take it into account.”
Institutional Stock Trading on Loan Market Information (2011, neutral): “This is an important observation, as literature on syndicated lending often relies on assumptions about stability of the lending syndicate (e.g., Ivashina, 2009).”
The Private Equity Advantage: Leveraged Buyout Firms and Relationship Banking (2011, positive): “Following previous literature (Ivashina 2009; Carey and Nini 2007), we control for (i) Deal amount?the logarithm of the total loan amount; (ii) Maturity?maturity (in months); (iii) Unsecured?a dummy variable equal to one if the loan is not secured; and (iv) Number of lenders?the number of lenders in”
The pricing of green bonds: Are financial institutions special? (2019, methodology): “To identify the lead bank in each loan, we follow previous literature (see, e.g. Ivashina, 2009, Acharya et al., 2018) and consider the definitions suggested by Standard & Poor’s, which for the European loan market are ‘mandated lead arranger’, ‘mandated arranger’, or ‘bookrunner’.”
Life below Zero: Bank Lending under Negative Policy Rates (2019, positive): “The lead share carries particular importance in syndicated lending, as it reflects lead arrangers’ incentives to monitor borrower behavior (see Ivashina (2009), Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010)).”
Bridging the Gap: The Design of Bank Loan Contracts and Distance (2015, positive): “…we first aggregate loans with multiple lead arrangers into one observation (by calculating the average distance between the borrower and the lead banks which hold the largest fraction of the loan; Ivashina, 2009), and then compute changes in contract characteristics across two successive tranches.”
The Role of Information Sharing in Modulating the Effect of Financial Access on Inequality (2019, background): “…Shleifer, 2007; Triki & Gajigo, 2014), decreases costs of credits (Brown et al., 2009), reduces default rates (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002), influences syndicated bank loans (Ivashina, 2009, Tanjung, Marciano, & Bartle, 2010) and affects corruption in lending procedures (Barth, Lin, Lin, & Song, 2009).”