On belief bias in syllogistic reasoning.

By Karl Christoph Klauer, J. Musch, Birgit Naumer. 2000

296 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Developmental and Educational Psychology, General Decision Sciences

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Citations in the corpus

Mental models and human reasoning (2010, unknown): “It can affect inferences that depend on a single model, perhaps because individuals have difficulty in constructing models of implausible situations (52).”
Cognitive Ability, Thinking Dispositions, and Instructional Set as Predictors of Critical Thinking. (2007, background): “The most popular formal reasoning task has been the syllogistic reasoning paradigm where validity and the believability of the conclusion are put in conflict (Evans et al., 1983; Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; Klauer et al., 2000 ).”
Belief-based and analytic processing in transitive inference depends on premise integration difficulty (2010, unknown): “Definitionally false statements (e.g., Some cats are not animals), which are included in the categorical syllogisms in some studies (e.g., Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000; Stupple & Ball, 2008), yield larger believability effects.”
Heuristics and Biases as Measures of Critical Thinking: Associations with Cognitive Ability and Thinking Dispositions (2008, unknown): “…of extensive study in the cognitive science literature, and several formal models of how belief bias operates to disrupt syllogis-Richard tic reasoning have been proposed (De Neys, 2006; Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; Evans & Feeney, 2004; Garnham & Oakhill, 2005; Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000).”
Belief bias in informal reasoning (2012, background): “Consequently more recent models have proposed that reasoners instead attempt to construct only a single model of the premises (Evans, 2000; Evans, Handley & Harper, 2001; Klauer et al., 2000; Thompson, Streimer, Reikoff, Gunter, & Campbell, 2003), with differing assumptions about how processing proc”
Language models show human-like content effects on reasoning (2022, background): “humans are much less likely to say it is valid (Evans et al., 1983; Evans and Perry, 1995; Klauer et al., 2000) — despite the fact that the arguments above are logically equivalent (both invalid).”
The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: Extension and evaluation (2006, methodology): “The problem with Wason’s (1960, 1968) argument is that all that is really being shown in these experiments is a positive testing bias, as was first demonstrated by Wetherick (1962), even though his critique was largely ignored in the literature prior to later reviews by Klayman and Ha (1987) and Eva”
On the resolution of conflict in dual process theories of reasoning (2007, background): “According to the Selective Processing Model, however, analytic processing is biased by the believability of the presented conclusion in the case of invalid-believable arguments, leading people frequently to avoid the counterexample case that would illustrate the fallacy.”
Heuristic and analytic processes in reasoning: an event-related potential study of belief bias. (2014, background): “This bias has been found in a range of reasoning tasks such as syllogistic reasoning (e.g., Evans et al., 1983; Klauer et al., 2000), relational reasoning (e.”
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition (2013, unknown): “Although the latter kind of processing produces a response bias to endorse believable conclusions, Type 2 processing motivates selective search for supporting and refuting models of the premises (Evans et al., 2001; Klauer et al., 2000).”
Time for a Radical Reappraisal of Tourist Decision Making? Toward a New Conceptual Model (2016, background): “For example, developmental psychologists found that in old age, people’s ability to apply abstract thinking and reasoning declines correspondingly, which leads to a higher dependency among this age group on the heuristic system rather than the analytic (Klauer, Musch, and Naumer 2000).”
Memory, reasoning, and categorization: parallels and common mechanisms (2014, background): “Belief bias refers to the fact that the ability to discriminate between logically valid and invalid arguments is apparently affected by the consistency of those arguments with background knowledge and beliefs (Klauer et al., 2000).”
Rapid responding increases belief bias: Evidence for the dual-process theory of reasoning (2005, background): “However, the model theory has always had difficulty accounting for belief bias on valid syllogisms, with a suggestion that this may reflect simply a response bias (Oakhill et al., 1989; see also Evans, Handley, & Harper, 2001; Klauer et al., 2000), a concept external to the theory.”
Questions and challenges for the new psychology of reasoning (2012, background): “Recent models also recognise that beliefs and context can influence Type 2 as well as Type 1 processing (Evans et al., 2001; Klauer et al., 2000; Verschueren et al., 2005; Weidenfeld, Oberauer, & Hornig, 2005).”