Wild Minds: What Animals Really Think

By Marc D. Hauser. 2000

321 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Genetics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1ed4ec7ed1e2dd9be81999d06799c774b6b48663

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Citations in the corpus

Alpha male black howler monkey responses to loud calls: effect of numeric odds, male companion behaviour and reproductive investment (2004, background): “rats: Capaldi & Miller 1988; parrots: Pepperberg 1994; rhesus monkeys: Brannon & Herbert 1998; see also review in Hauser 2000 ) and a similar cognitive mechanism might explain the ability of black howler monkeys to compare relative group size.”
Foundations of Language: Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution (2002, background): “…system dealing with physical space and perhaps some of the parts dealing with social relations and other minds, conceptualist semantics further makes contact with research on primate cognition (Premack 1976, Tomasello 2000, Hauser 2000, Povinelli 2001, Cheney and Seyfarth 1990, Köhler 1927).”
The evolution of the language faculty: clarifications and implications. (2005, unknown): “In a summary of research on mental state attribution, (Hauser, 2000) concluded that the ability to represent others’ minds (“theory of mind”) was absent in animals, but as the review went to press, Hare and colleagues provided the first solid evidence of this capacity in chimpanzees (Hare, Call, Agn”
High-tide habitat choice: insights from modelling roost selection by shorebirds around a tropical bay (2006, background): “Our study indicates that the study of roost choice can provide important insights into the adaptive basis for daily strategies, with the prospect of insights into the cognitive architecture of the birds under study (Dukas 1998; Shettleworth 1998; Hauser 2001 ).”
Putting the Dog Back in the Park: Animal and Human Mind-in-Action (2006, background): “If we are suggesting that “animal minds are wild minds, shaped by a history of environmental pressures”(Hauser, 2001, p. xvi), then these minds will not be found by looking “inside their heads” but instead by studying animals’ practical skills in the “wildness” of where ever it is that they inhabit.”
Putting the altruism back into altruism: the evolution of empathy. (2008, background): “In this view, then, empathy is a cognitive affair dependent on imagination and mental state attribution, which may explain the skepticism about nonhuman empathy (Hauser 2000, Povinelli 1998).”
Does participation in intergroup conflict depend on numerical assessment, range location, or rank for wild chimpanzees? (2001, background): “Indeed, the capacity for numerical assessment may be widespread among animals (e.g. Hauser 2000).”
Evolving the Psychological Mechanisms for Cooperation (2005, background): “For example, given evidence of limits on number discrimination (Dehaene 1997, Gallistel 1990, Hauser 2000), it makes little sense to set up payoff matrices that entail nondiscriminable alternatives.”
Comparing the Complex Cognition of Birds and Primates (2004, background): “This has been especially true for non-human primates (Hauser, 2000).”
Tactical use of unimodal and bimodal communication by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) (2004, background): “…nonhuman primates or other animals can discriminate such abstract concepts as attention, intentions or epistemic states in other individuals (Cheney & Seyfarth 1990; Povinelli et al. 1990; Donald 1991; Povinelli & Eddy 1996; Tomasello & Call 1997; Theall & Povinelli 1999; Hauser 2000; Whiten 2000).”
On seeing human: a three-factor theory of anthropomorphism. (2007, background): “Most existing research therefore addresses the actual mental states and abilities of nonhuman agents by detailing the extent to which these agents really are humanlike and the extent to which anthropomorphism represents accurate insight versus fanciful illusion (e.g., Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990; Hauser”
The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents (2005, background): “Vervetmonkeys even have distinct alarm calls for different predator species or groups of species: snake, leopard and cheetah, hawk eagle, and so forth (Hauser, 2000).”