The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government

By Eric Maskin, Jean Tirole. 2004

922 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/18d54588cbd7bea5ea391a5277b25cc5c5136ee0

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. T. Nannicini
2. Shanna Rose
3. Rohini Pande
4. D. Stasavage
5. James E. Alt
6. Andréa Stella
7. Yi Lu
8. Pei Li

In Political Science and International Relations

1. V. Rao
2. James E. Alt
3. Tim Besley
4. Rohini Pande
5. Shanna Rose
6. T. Nannicini
7. Andréa Stella
8. D. Stasavage

Citations in the corpus

• Term Limits and Electoral Accountability (2013, positive): “π1 1 = π0(1− p) π0(1− p) + (1− π0)(1− q) < π0 (25)”
• Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection (2013, positive): “Actually, in the first term, better paid politicians seem to “pander” more to voters (Maskin and Tirole, 2004) by increasing both expenditure and transfers, but these effects are never statistically significant.”
• Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits (2011, background): “Several models generate behavior where high-type politicians pander to voters’ interests (Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts 2001; Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2007; Fox 2007; Maskin and Tirole 2004).”
• Learning About Voter Rationality (2018, neutral): “…(2001), Coate (2004), Daley and Snowberg (2011), Eggers (2017), Fox and Jordan (2011), Fox and Stephenson (2011, 2015), Fox and Van Weelden (2010, 2012), Gehlbach (2007), Gordon, Huber, and Landa (2007), Lohmann (1998), Maskin and Tirole (2004), Myerson (2006), and Persson and Tabellini (2000).”
• The Wrong Kind of Transparency (2005, neutral): “Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole [6] present examples in which the agent works harder if the principal receives a coarser signal on agent performance rather than observing performance directly.”
• Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining (2004, background): “…jurisdiction+ The bargaining game is kept simple by assuming that one of the two representatives is 15+ See Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts 2001; Maskin and Tirole 2001; and Besley forthcoming+ 16+ Prat 2003+ 17+ Fingleton and Raith 2002+ selected at random to make a proposalo that the other…”
• Political Selection and the Quality of Government: Evidence from South India (2005, positive): “For example, Coate and Morris (1995) draw out implications for the quality of public decisions and Maskin and Tirole (2004) contrast appointing versus electing judges in this framework.”