Political Selection and the Quality of Government: Evidence from South India

By Tim Besley, Rohini Pande, V. Rao. 2005

162 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c2ba261ed65ebbb4b85b371fc7de13917f243bce

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Citations in the corpus

Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes (2006, unknown): “Based upon the results of Brazil’s recent anti-corruption program that randomly audits municipal expenditures of federally-transferred funds, it estimates the effects of the disclosure of local government corruption practices upon the re-election success of incumbent mayors.”
The Impact of Political Leaders' Profession and Education on Reforms (2009, unknown): “Besley et al. (2005), to the contrary, use household survey data from India and find that differences in the performance of Indian village politicians are systematically linked to politicians’ education.”
The Adverse Effects of Sunshine: A Field Experiment on Legislative Transparency in an Authoritarian Assembly (2012, unknown): “Better access to information seems to force politicians to respond more appropriately to citizen demands, both in developed (Alt, Lassen, and Skilling 2002) and developing countries (Besley and Burgess 2002; Besley, Pande, and Rao 2006; Brunetti and Weder 2003).”
Do Markets Care About Central Bank Governor Changes? Evidence from Emerging Markets (2010, background): “We gauge the effect of the announcement of the departure of the central bank governor on sovereign bond spreads, stock market indices and the foreign exchange rates vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar.15 We start with three simple tests.”
Community-Based Development and Poverty Alleviation: an Evaluation of China's Poor Village Investment Program (2010, unknown): “Besley et al (2005) find that the poor are more likely to participate in public meetings about poverty transfers and to receive transfers conditional on participating.”