Term Limits and Electoral Accountability

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Government transparency and policymaking (2007, methodology): “Recent models of political agency suggest that when such divergence exists, voter welfare can be improved by either term-limiting incumbents or providing office holders with lifetime appointments (Maskin & Tirole, 2004; Smart & Sturm, 2006 ).”
Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits (2011, background): “Ultimately, the debate over term limits entails weighing these disadvantages against the potential advantages, such as limiting opportun-ism (e.g., Smart and Sturm 2006) and reducing the incumbency advantage.”
Decentralization and Local Governments' Performance: How Does Fiscal Autonomy Affect Spending Efficiency? (2012, unknown): “The theoretical literature suggests that the impossibility to be re-elected influences the opportunistic behaviour of the incumbents, especially in proximity of the new elections (e.g., Besley and Case, 1995, 2003; Smart and Sturm, 2006).”
Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection (2013, unknown): “6See—among others—Rogoff (1990), Besley and Case (1995), Maskin and Tirole (2004), List and Sturm (2006), Smart and Sturm (2006), and Ferraz and Finan (2007).”