The Wrong Kind of Transparency

By Andrea Prat. 2005

647 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

Citations in the corpus

Challenges for Transparency (2017, background): “Much of this focuses on the benefits of transparency but some earlier work, notably in economics and social science, also considers drawbacks of transparency and accountability (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999; Prat, 2005; Etzioni, 2010; Peled, 2011; Bernstein, 2014).”
Why is transparency about public expenditure so elusive? (2012, background): “Prat (2005) highlighted the damaging effects of the ‘wrong kind of transparency’.”
Government transparency and policymaking (2007, methodology): “15 Similar terminology is employed in Smart and Sturm (2006) 16 For example, the voter would know whether the legislature approved a tax cut, but he would not know whether his representative voted for that tax cut See Stasavage (forthcoming) for an explicit analysis of transparency in a legislative ”
Transparency: Motivations and Challenges (2017, background): “h of this focuses on the beneﬁts of transparency but some earlier work, notably in economics and social science, also considers drawbacks of transparency and accountability (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999; Prat, 2005; Etzioni, 2010; Peled, 2011; Bernstein, 2014). We discuss related work throughout the tex”
Accountability and Transparency in English Local Government: Moving from 'Matching Parts' to 'Awkward Couple'? (2015, neutral): “Furthermore, as Prat (2005) suggests, the ‘wrong kind’ of transparency – that which concerns activities rather than consequences – can cause problems because the agent has an incentive to portray their behaviour as being somehow ‘normal’.”
Sunshine as Disinfectant: The Effect of State Freedom of Information Act Laws on Public Corruption (2014, background): “), Besley and Prat (2006), who develop a model that predicts that media capture by the government increases the likelihood that elected politicians engage in corruption and/or rent extraction and reduces the likelihood that bad politicians are identified and replaced, and Snyder and Strömberg (2010)”
Transparency and deliberation within the FOMC: a computational linguistics approach (2014, background): “Greater disclosure can induce experts who are concerned with their professional reputation to pool on actions that are optimal given available public signals even when their private signals would suggest that other actions are optimal (Prat 2005).”
Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability (2006, neutral): “However, see Prat (2005) for a discussion of career concerns models where increased transparency leads to worse outcomes.”
Institutions and Organizational Structure: The Case of State-Owned Corporate Pyramids (2013, background): “Prat (2005) further distinguishes two types of information that a principal can have about the agent, namely, information about the consequences of the agent’s action and information about the action itself.”
A Political Theory of Populism (2013, background): “Then, an honest politician will choose his bliss point xh2 = 0.”
Transparency is not Enough: Making Transparency Effective in Reducing Corruption (2010, background): “…as envisaged by deliberative democratic theorists, is contingent on the characteristics of both the public sphere and the private ‘backstage’); Prat (2005) (arguing that conformist pressures may imply that transparency with respect to the consequences of agency behavior may be beneficial…”