Cache Attacks on Intel SGX

By Johannes Götzfried, Moritz Eckert, Sebastian Schinzel, Tilo Müller. 2017

438 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Hardware and Architecture, Signal Processing

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Citations in the corpus

Slalom: Fast, Verifiable and Private Execution of Neural Networks in Trusted Hardware (2018, background): “In the past years, many attacks have been proposed, with the goal of undermining privacy of enclave computations (Xu et al., 2015; Brasser et al., 2017; Moghimi et al., 2017; Götzfried et al., 2017; Van Bulck et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2017).”
Ekiden: A Platform for Confidentiality-Preserving, Trustworthy, and Performant Smart Contracts (2018, positive): “Although trusted hardware aims to protect confidentiality for TEE, recent work has uncovered data leakage via side-channel attacks [18, 38, 40, 46, 53, 54, 66, 70, 79, 91, 93].”
SGX-Bomb: Locking Down the Processor via Rowhammer Attack (2017, background): “Many sidechannels attacks exploiting page fault [7, 32, 37], cache timing [6, 13, 16, 30], and branch prediction [24] have been proposed to attack SGX.”
SgxPectre Attacks: Leaking Enclave Secrets via Speculative Execution (2018, methodology): “s in SGX. The SGXPECTRE Attacksarevariantsofmicro-architecturalsidechannel attacks. Previously, various micro-architectural side-channel attacks have been demonstrated on SGX, which CPU cache attacks [58, 13, 27, 25], BTB attacks [42], page-tableattacks [80, 62, 72], cache-DRAM attacks [75], etc. SG”
CacheZoom: How SGX Amplifies The Power of Cache Attacks (2017, background): “Several Cache attacks on SGX have recently and concurrently been shown, e.g. on AES [22] and RSA [12].”
SGX-LKL: Securing the Host OS Interface for Trusted Execution (2019, background): “Cache side channel attacks [16,41,68] are not speciﬁc to TEEs because they are enabled by micro-architectural resource sharing.”
SgxPectre: Stealing Intel Secrets from SGX Enclaves Via Speculative Execution (2018, background): “Previously, various micro-architectural side-channel attacks have been demonstrated on SGX, which CPU cache attacks [7, 19, 21, 60], BTB attacks [44], page-table attacks [64, 74, 82], cache-DRAM attacks [77], etc .”
Telling Your Secrets without Page Faults: Stealthy Page Table-Based Attacks on Enclaved Execution (2017, background): “Finally, between submission and publication of this paper, the SGX research community has witnessed a steady stream of microarchitectural side-channel attacks; either by abusing the branch prediction unit [28], or in the form of finegrained PRIME+PROBE [13, 37, 5, 33] cache attacks.”
An Algorithmic Framework For Differentially Private Data Analysis on Trusted Processors (2018, background): “) As a result, accesses leaked through memory side-channels 4 undermine the confidentiality promise of enclaves [55, 49, 30, 35, 17, 12, 38].”
Foreshadow: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Kingdom with Transient Out-of-Order Execution (2018, neutral): “This property has recently been abused to mount stealthy SGX P RIME +P ROBE L1 cache side-channel attacks entirely from a co-resident logical processor, without interrupting the victim enclave [6,17,51].”
Occlumency: Privacy-preserving Remote Deep-learning Inference Using SGX (2019, background): “Prior studies suggested various sidechannel attacks to SGX applications (on memory management [75], and CPU cache [22, 30, 33]) although SGX provides strong confidentiality and integrity of codes and data.”
Software Grand Exposure: SGX Cache Attacks Are Practical (2017, background): “Our attack differs from other recently proposed cachebased attacks on SGX [44, 38, 19] in various ways: CacheZoom [38] interrupts the victim repeatedly and can therefore be easily detected by the above mentioned countermeasures T-SGX [46] and Déjá Vu [10].”
On Security Analysis of Proof-of-Elapsed-Time (PoET) (2017, background): “Trusted computing components may fail to defend against tampering due to design/implementation bugs and attacks [18,31], and become compromised.”
Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks (2017, background): “Attack from Attack on Benign Benign Benign Userspace Kernel SGX Enclave Malicious Userspace 3 [33, 39] 3 [22] 3 new Malicious Kernel — — 3 new [8, 17,37] Malicious SGX Enclave 3 new 3 new 3 new”
DeepAttest: An End-to-End Attestation Framework for Deep Neural Networks (2019, background): “The vulnerabilities of SGX to potential attacks such as spectre[26], cache[17] or other side-channel attacks are later identified.”