The Moonlighting Game An Experimental Study On Reciprocity And Retribution

By Klaus Abbink, Bernd Irlenbusch, E. Renner. 2000

254 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/133126da044db136978a6d5cdf158e4a3d60791b

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Citations in the corpus

A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness (2007, methodology): “Cox, Sadiraj, and Sadiraj (2004) apply the triadic design to the moonlighting game introduced by Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner (2000), and report that altruism and positive reciprocity (but not negative reciprocity) are significant motives.”
LEGAL CORRUPTION: LEGAL CORRUPTION (2011, background): “Abbink et al. (2000, 2002) introduced reciprocity games that mimic situations where corruption arises: by inducing economic incentives, these games make corruption incentive-compatible.”
The Importance of Emotions for the Effectiveness of Social Punishment (2006, unknown): “, 2005), and moonlighting games (Abbink et al., 2000).”
Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations (2010, methodology): “Abbink et al. (2000) use the moonlighting game to analyze punishment and reward, and Croson and Konow (2008) a variant of the dictator game with reward and punishment.”
Perspectives on experimental research in managerial accounting (2003, background): “23 For discussions regarding these, and other, factors see Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner (2000), Arrow (1974), Baron (2000), Elster (1989), Evans et al. (2001), MacCrimmon and Messick (1976), Rutledge and Karim (1999), and Williamson (1985, 1996). tage is not so much in examining whether social…”
Propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: Experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore (2009, background): “In order to minimize the experimenter effects, we made sure that one of the authors (the same one) was present in all the countries where we ran 13 The games are welfare-enhancing and welfare-reducing both before and after taking into account the relevant conversion rates.”
Psychological foundations of incentives (2001, unknown): “…other studies suggesting the existence of reciprocity-driven voluntary cooperation (see, e.g., Fehr et al., 1993; Berg et al., 1995; Bolle and Kritikos, 1998; Brandts and Charness, 1999; Fehr and Falk, 1999; McCabe et al., 1998, 2000; Charness, 2000; Abbink et al., 2000; GQachter and Falk, 2001).”
Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity (2000, background): “Many studies have carried out detailed analyses of individual decisions and found that the fraction of subjects exhibiting reciprocal choices is between 40 and 66 percent (Gächter and Falk; 1999; Berg et al., 1995; Fehr and Falk, 1999; Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner, 2000).”
The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons (2011, unknown): “23 In the 29 21 Some additional evidence comes from comparing behavior in the moonlighting game in Falk et al. (2008), who use the strategy method, and in Abbink et al. (2000), who use direct response.”
Representative Trust and Reciprocity: Prevalence and Determinants (2008, background): “For example, positive reciprocity tends to be weaker than negative reciprocity in laboratory experiments (e.g., see Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner 2000).”