Piece Rates, Fixed Wages, and Incentive Effects : Statistical Evidence From Payroll Records

By Harry J. Paarsch, Bruce Shearer. 2000

323 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1256103c213d6d537a00bfb0bd0a4e3b8fa653d9

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Citations in the corpus

Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment (2004, background): “…have considered measuring the cost of moral hazard within the firm (Ferrall and Shearer (1999), Margiotta and Miller (2000), Copeland and Monet (2002)), measuring productivity profiles (Shearer, 1996), as well as measuring incentive effects (Paarsch and Shearer (1999, 2000), Haley (forthcoming)).”
A structural model of sales-force compensation dynamics: Estimation and field implementation (2009, background): “paper is also related to the work of Ferrall and Shearer (1999), Paarsch and Shearer (2000) , Lee and Zenios (2007), and Jiang and Palmatier (2009), who estimate static, structural models of agent behavior, while modeling the optimal contract choice by the firm; and to Dufflo et al. (2010) who esti”
How performance related pay affects productivity and employment (2010, unknown): “Similar incentive and sorting effects are found in Paarsch and Shearer (2000).”
Pay for Performance in the Public Sector—Benefits and (Hidden) Costs (2010, unknown): “46 *** 0.18 22.53 2 2 2 26 Paarsch and Shearer (2000) 1 17 17 1.08 *** 0.37 2.93 1 2 27 Phillips and Freedman (1988) 4 17 17 0.70 *** 0.18 3.97 2 1 and 2 2 28 Pinder (1976) 2 20 20 0.75 ** 0.33 2.30 2 1 2 29 Pokorny (1994) 8 17 17 20.”
The Impact of Pay and Promotion on Job Satisfaction: Evidence from Higher Education Institutes of Pakistan (2012, background): “Managers who have been promoted feel more satisfaction with opportunities regarding promotion and have more expectations for future promotion[23].”
Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work (2002, background): “which is discussed by Prendergast (1999) and Gibbons and Waldman (1998).”
The Last American Shoe Manufacturers: Decreasing Productivity and Increasing Profits in the Shift from Piece Rates to Continuous Flow Production (2005, unknown): “There is widespread agreement that piece rates induce greater effort than do time rates of pay (Brown 1990) and that wages and production are higher under piece rates than time rates (Seiler 1984; Shearer 1996; Lazear 2000; Paarsch and Shearer 2000; Pencavel 2001).”
Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment (2007, methodology): “Our analysis complements recent evidence on the effects of incentives to bottom-tier workers on their own or aggregate firm performance (Lazear 2000, Paarsch and Shearer 2000, Jones and Kato 1995), and on the effect of incentive pay for CEOs and managers on aggregate firm performance (Chevalier and…”
Performance Pay, Risk Attitudes and Job Satisfaction (2008, unknown): “Performance pay, risk attitudes and job satisfaction Thomas Cornelissen a, John S. Heywood b, Uwe Jirjahn c,⁎ a Department of Economics, University College London, UK b Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, USA c Department of Economics, University of Trier, Germany a b s t r…”