A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control

By Clifford G. Holderness. 2001

644 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/117e8c8f71c92f7b8668add36d10c4f7be814af1

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Citations in the corpus

The information content of cash dividend announcements in a unique environment (2011, positive): “The Claessens et al. (2002) paper surveys evidence from eight East Asian economies, Holderness (2003) includes all nations, while Denis and McConnell (2003) examine all nations except the U.S. reducing the agency problem.”
The governance role of multiple large shareholders: evidence from the valuation of cash holdings (2011, positive): “For instance, Kahn and Winton (1998) identify occurrences where large shareholders prefer to opportunistically trade on private information instead of monitoring management. Based on the discussion above, it is not clear a priori whether MLS exert efficient monitoring or collude to divert corporate ”
Control Transfers, Privatization, and Corporate Performance: Efficiency Gains in China's Listed Companies (2008, background): “during the 1980s as reported by Barclay and Holderness (1991). Both types of transfer show significant increases in stock prices although the magnitudes vary from 21.02% (12.83%) for state transfers to 25.06% (15.50%) for transfers to private firms using the industry (matched firm) benchmark. While,”
Corporate boards, audit committees and voluntary disclosure: evidence from Italian Listed Companies (2013, background): “Dominant shareholders may seek to maximize their own utility and expropriate wealth from other investors as well as from other stakeholders, such as the employees (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Holderness 2003 ).”
Motivated monitors: The importance of institutional investors׳ portfolio weights (2015, neutral): “In a survey of the literature, Holderness (2003) asserts that with the exception of the form (and level) of executive compensation, few major corporate decisions have been shown to be different in the presence of blockholders.”
A new finance capitalism? Mutual funds and ownership re-concentration in the United States (2008, background): “…to a review of research on large blockholders, ‘Studies infrequently address the stock ownership of outside blockholders who do not serve on the board of directorsylarge-block shareholders or their representatives almost always serve as directors or officers’ (Holderness, 2003; emphasis added).”
Block Ownership, Trading Activity, and Market Liquidity (2009, neutral): “2See Holderness (2003) for a review of the block ownership literature.”
European Takeover Regulation (2003, positive): “Starting with Demsetz and Lehn (1985), numerous empirical papers examine the relationship between ownership concentration and firm value/performance for a given country, typically the US (for a survey see Holderness, 2002).”
Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey (2005, neutral): “For a survey of the governance effects of outside blockholders, see Holderness (2001). and the level of incentives in equilibrium.”
Large Shareholders and Corporate Policies (2009, background): “See Holderness (2003) for a survey of the blockholder literature, and Holderness (2006) for evidence that many U.”
Board gender diversity and dividend policy in Australian listed firms: the effect of ownership concentration (2019, positive): “This finding is consistent with the results of previous studies (Byoun et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2016; Pucheta-Martínez & Bel-Oms, 2016) that women directors increase dividend payments.”