Large Shareholders and Corporate Policies

By Henrik Cronqvist, Rüdiger Fahlenbrach. 2009

418 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0b05e37b6821d1116b50a441851d3839deba0b44

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. M. Carney
2. Marc van Essen
3. Ronald W. Masulis
4. Yongtae Kim
5. Augustine Duru
6. Ye Cai
7. J. V. van Oosterhout
8. Ronald C. Anderson

In Finance

1. Ye Cai
2. Wei Jiang
3. Alon Brav
4. B. Boyd
5. A. Solarino
6. C. Krishnan
7. Carrie Pan
8. Yiwei Dou

Citations in the corpus

• Blockholders and Corporate Governance (2014, neutral): “Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach (2009) disaggregate the data and study the importance of blockholder identity by identifying fixed effects for different classes of outside blockholders.”
• Investor Horizons and Corporate Policies (2013, neutral): “Moreover, recent research suggests that different blockholders prefer different corporate policies and their preferences affect corporate behavior (e.g., Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009), Becker, Cronqvist, and Fahlenbrach (2011)).”
• Corporate boards and the performance of Asian firms: A meta-analysis (2012, result): “This conjecture is consistent with research on ownership that finds that certain types of blockholders indeed promote risky investments in R&D for similar reasons (Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009).”
• Board interlocks and the diffusion of disclosure policy (2014, positive): “9 As a robustness check, we also use public pension funds as a proxy for long-term investors because pension funds tend to have longer investment horizons and often monitor firms more actively than other investors (Smith 1996; Gillan and Starks 2000; Gompers and Metrick 2001; Qiu 2006; Cronqvist and”
• Motivated monitors: The importance of institutional investors׳ portfolio weights (2015, neutral): “Our paper is related to work by Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988), Bushee (1998), Chen, Harford and Li (2007), and Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009).”
• Investor Activism and Takeovers (2009, background): “In addition, from their study of all blockholders of U.S. public companies between 1980 and 2005, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2006) find that large shareholders exert measurable effects on firms’ investment and financial policies, as well as executive compensation.”
• Ownership of Corporations (2016, background): “However, blockholders in some cultures are reluctant to question managerial decisions, and are less likely to engage in monitoring behavior (e.g., Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009).”
• Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership (2018, neutral): “…investors’ involvement in corporate governance (e.g., Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Matvos and Ostrovsky, 2008; Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009; Harford, Jenter, and Li, 2011; Kaplan and Minton, 2012; Massa and Žaldokas, 2013; Katz and McIntosh, 2013; Kempf,…”
• Venture Capital Reputation, Post-IPO Performance and Corporate Governance (2009, background): “While larger firms may have smaller insider shareholdings, they are also likely to have larger institutional investor shareholdings (see Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009)).”