Models of cooperation based on the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift game

By Michael Doebeli, C. Hauert. 2005

868 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Genetics, Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8efc95ce96dbcd125514fa26b1377868397eaf7e

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In Genetics

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Citations in the corpus

Factors affecting individual participation in group-level aggression among non-human primates (2007, neutral): “At one end of the spectrum are traditional games (reviewed in Nunn & Lewis, 2001; Doebeli & Hauert, 2005), which, at their simplest, involve two equally-matched players making moves simultaneously, each choosing among a few discrete strategies.”
Snowdrift game dynamics and facultative cheating in yeast (2009, neutral): “In this case, the cheaters would always outgrow the cooperators, and the interaction would be what is called a "prisoner’s dilemma", in which cooperation is not sustainable in a well-mixed environment1,17.”
Sex role preferences, gender conflict and sperm trading in simultaneous hermaphrodites : a new framework (2006, background): “Models that allow such continuous decisions have recently been implemented (Killingback & Doebeli 2002; Doebeli & Hauert 2005 ).”
Coevolutionary games - A mini review (2009, background): “…and Tőke, 1998; Brauchli et al., 1999; Szabó et al., 2000; Tanimoto and Sagara, 2007; Alonso-Sanz, 2009; Newth and Cornforth, 2009), and the subject has since been reviewed comprehensively on different occasions (Hauert, 2002; Doebeli and Hauert, 2005; Szabó and Fáth, 2007; Roca et al., 2009a).”
Fixation times in evolutionary games under weak selection (2008, background): “Important examples for such games are the HawkDove game [44] or the Snowdrift game [45].”
The principles of collective animal behaviour (2006, background): “... and experimental tests of theories of why selfish individuals ‘apparently’ co-operate: aggregations may result from individuals attempting to put others between themselves and danger to create a selfish herd (Hamilton 1971) or to minimize the cost of disintegration (Parrish & Edelstein-Keshet 19”