Breaking up is hard to do? An analysis of termination fee provisions and merger outcomes
By Thomas W. Bates, Michael L. Lemmon. 2003
318 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0e497e3a6b2a693a2f7538e42e0b77b3a96429c8
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Nihat Aktas
- Eric de Bodt
- Kenneth R. Ahern
- Richard Roll
- Tony W. Tong
- Micah S. Officer
- Jarrad Harford
- Jeffrey J. Reuer
In Strategy and Management
- Tony W. Tong
- Jarrad Harford
- Jeffrey J. Reuer
- Cheng-Wei Wu
- Kenneth R. Ahern
- S. Pavićević
- Richard Roll
- Xena Welch
Citations in the corpus
- Shared Auditors in Mergers and Acquisitions (2016, unknown): “…toeholds (Toehold Indicator) and tender offers (Tender Offer) (Betton, Eckbo and Thormurn, 2009), termination fees (Target termination fee) (Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Officer, 2003), form of payment (Cash only deal) (Eckbo and Langohr, 1989), deal hostility (Hostile deal) (Schwert, 2002),…”
- The Toehold Puzzle (2005, unknown): “Our sample of 1,191 lockups in the target and 2,714 target breakup fees is larger than that of Burch (2001) who studies 158 lockups, and Officer (2003) and Bates and Lemmon (2003), who examines 1,052 and 1,123 target breakup fees, respectively.”
- Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions (2003, background): “1 In contemporaneous work unknown to the current author through much of the submission process, Bates and Lemmon (2003) examine similar issues as those covered in the current paper.”
- Board classification and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from the market for corporate control (2008, unknown): “To discriminate between the economic effects of initial and follow-on bids, we define an auction sequence following Bates and Lemmon (2003).”
- Takeover Contests with Asymmetric Bidders (2006, unknown): “, Jennings and Mazeo (1993), Comment and Schwert (1995), Bates and Lemmon (2003), Officer (2003), or Peck (2002)]. Even in the case of MBO offers, where bidder asymmetry should be most pronounced, Kaplan (1989) finds significant premia and argues that management cannot use informational advantages t”
- The Real Effects of Uncertainty on Merger Activity (2016, background): “Given that merger renegotiations or terminations entail non-trivial costs to each party (Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Officer, 2004), high volatility would make the marginal deal less profitable in expectation.”
- A Signaling Theory of Acquisition Premiums: Evidence from IPO Targets (2012, background): “Prior studies have examined the influence of these corporate governance variables on acquisition premiums for more established targets (e.g., Bange & Mazzeo, 2004; Bargeron et al., 2008; Bates & Lemmon, 2003).”
- The Pre-Deal Phase of Mergers and Acquisitions: A Review and Research Agenda (2020, background): “To overcome information asymmetry concerns and guard against residual uncertainty, acquirers can hire advisors 858 Journal of Management / July 2020 (Boeh, 2011) or use contractual mechanisms, such as termination fees (Bates & Lemmon, 2003) and material adverse clauses (Denis & Macias, 2013).”
- Lost in Translation? The Effect of Cultural Values on Mergers Around the World (2015, background): “Similar to the use of cash payments, target termination fees are more common when there is greater information asymmetry between targets and acquirers, consistent with an insurance motive (Officer, 2003; Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Boone and Mulherin, 2006).”