Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions

By Micah S. Officer. 2003

596 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/85b7afb97c9618f426436ac8fa39c26b5a1005f1

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Citations in the corpus

Club Deals in Leveraged Buyouts (2010, unknown): “This fact is potentially important for the interpretation of the results in Table 3 that club deals produce lower premiums for target shareholders in light of existing evidence that target shareholder gains are negatively related to target size (e.g., Comment and Schwert, 1995; Officer, 2003).”
Motivated monitors: The importance of institutional investors׳ portfolio weights (2015, unknown): “…ownership of monitoring institutions in the target firm are still negatively related to the acquirer’s return as measured 15 Specifically, following Officer (2003), we first estimate a premium based on component data using the aggregate value of cash, stock, and other securities offered by the…”
Why do private acquirers pay so little compared to public acquirers (2008, unknown): “Officer (2003) shows that target termination fees result in significantly higher premiums.”
Do Auctions Induce a Winner's Curse? New Evidence from the Corporate Takeover Market (2008, background): “Lowry and Shu (2002), Officer (2003) , and Smith (1987) also use simultaneous equations analysiss in related applications.”
Deal Size, Acquisition Premia and Shareholder Gains (2013, unknown): “We also add a corporate diversification indicator variable ( DIVERS ) to control for the fact that higher premiums are normally offered in intra - industry mergers ( Officer , 2003 ) .”
Does policy uncertainty affect mergers and acquisitions? (2017, unknown): “Yet, Officer (2003) and 34 AC CE PT ED M AN US CR IP T Bates and Lemmon (2003) show a positive link between termination fees and deal premiums, likely because deals with more expensive exit strategies are more likely to be completed.”
Firm size and the gains from acquisitions (2004, background): “As reported by Officer ( 2003 ) , the data on premiums have a number of problems .”
The cost of pride: Why do firms from developing countries bid higher? (2011, unknown): “The measure of bid premium using SDC price data is criticized by Officer (2003) on grounds that it is has a tendency of reporting outliers below zero (an economically reasonable lower bound) and greater than 100%.”
How have M&As changed? Evidence from the sixth merger wave (2012, unknown): “The first is the offer price over the target‟s share price four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement and is reported for observations between zero and two as in Officer (2003).”
The price of corporate liquidity: Acquisition discounts for unlisted targets (2007, unknown): “For example, Schwert (1996) reports average premiums for publicly traded targets of 30% using cumulative abnormal returns to the target stock and Officer (2003) finds premiums for public targets that average 55% by comparing SDC acquisition prices to target stock prices prior to the acquisition…”
Lost in Translation? The Effect of Cultural Values on Mergers Around the World (2015, background): “Similar to the use of cash payments, target termination fees are more common when there is greater information asymmetry between targets and acquirers, consistent with an insurance motive (Officer, 2003; Bates and Lemmon, 2003; Boone and Mulherin, 2006).”
Deviation from the Target Capital Structure and Acquisition Choices (2011, unknown): “I follow Officer (2003) to construct the Acquisition Premium variable which is the aggregate value of cash, stock and other securities offered to the target divided by the market capitalization of the target 40 days prior to the announcement. Consistent with Officer (2003), I truncate the variable b”
Investment Banks as Insiders and the Market for Corporate Control (2009, unknown): “Toeholds, poison pills, and hostility are present in 9%, 3%, and 8%, respectively, of deals in our sample, as opposed to 10%, 2%, and 8% in Officer (2003).”