Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong

By F. Feldman, J. Mackie. 1977

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Citations in the corpus

The role of emotions in judging the moral acceptability of risks (2006, background): “If, for example, morality were merely subjective or constituted by conventionality or ‘ways of life’ (Mackie, 1977), it is hard to see how we can say that one way of life can be better than another.”
The meta-ethical grounding of our moral beliefs: Evidence for meta-ethical pluralism (2013, background): “A common assumption amongst philosophers—whether taken as a sign of intuitive moral competence or as a regrettable flaw—is that they are (Blackburn, 1984; Brink, 1989; Mackie, 1977; Shafer-Landau, 2003; Smith, 1994).”
What Is the Benacerraf Problem (2016, background): “1 of Mackie (1977), as well as Alan Gibbard’s discussion of “deep vindication” in Sect.”
Much of the ‘economics of property rights’ devalues property and legal rights (2015, background): “The whole point of actions in accord with perceived legitimacy or morality is that they do not necessarily serve self-interest (Hodgson, 2013a, 2014; Joyce, 2006; Mackie, 1977).”
Power, Moral Clarity, and Punishment in the Workplace (2013, background): “…as though they are unaware of their own social position and circumstance while deciding what is right; finally, the conventional view of ethics (e.g., Mackie, 1977; Fritzsche & Becker, 1984; Kohlberg, 1969, 1981; Payne & Giacalone, 1990; Phillips, 1992; Toffler, 1986; Turiel, 2002) holds that…”
Mental representations of social values (2010, background): “An interesting alternative philosophy takes the emphasis away from reasoning and toward emotion (Hume, 1978; Mackie, 1977; Westermarck, 1906; Wittgenstein, 1965).”
The transparency of experience (2002, background): “…experience.45 45 The term ‘error-theory’ originates with J.L. Mackie’s views of secondary qualities and of moral properties—see Mackie, 1975 Chs. 1 & 2; Mackie, 1977 Ch. 1—on the view of secondary qualities advocated, they do not have the nature that our experience presents them as having; in the…”
In Defence of Repugnance (2008, background): “In addition to those who doubt the validity of intuition as a source of ethical knowledge (Mackie 1977; Sinnott-Armstrong 2006), some philosophers reject the notion of the overall goodness of an event or state of affairs, or of improving or worsening the world as a whole.”
The Perceived Objectivity of Ethical Beliefs: Psychological Findings and Implications for Public Policy (2010, background): “It would, of course, be of interest to investigate this, and also to investigate whether perceptions of objectivity are stronger in Western cultures than in others (see Mackie 1977, for discussion of how notions of objectivity permeate Western moral discourse).”
Responsibility for Each Other's Freedom: Agency as the Source of Collective Capability (2007, background): “For instance, as Mackie (1977) points out, if the action of person B is a blameworthy response to an action of person A, then A may be held responsible to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the degree of inevitability of person B’s response to A.”
After objectivity: an empirical study of moral judgment (2004, background): “I will not rehearse any of the arguments against objectivity (e.g. Harman, 1985; Hume, 1739/1964; Mackie, 1977; Nichols, 2004), but in the remainder of this paper, I want to explore the impact that rejecting objectivity would have on lay moral judgment.”