Managerial discipline and corporate restructuring following performance declines

By David J. Denis, Timothy A. Kruse. 2000

344 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/064fabe85da94497aa65d580b12629c192f1509f

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Citations in the corpus

Governance with poor investor protection: evidence from top executive turnover in Italy (2002, methodology): “The former is the measure of performance used in Denis and Kruse (2000).”
Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies (2001, background): “Denis and Kruse (2000) find that the presence of large blockholders, other than directors and their families, does not have an impact on industryadjusted operating performance and they find no evidence of ownership structure influencing nonroutine board turnover.”
Financial distress: Lifecycle and corporate restructuring (2015, background): “A firm is deemed to have undertaken a strategy of laying off its employees if it has a more than 20 percent fall in the number of employees between year t-1 and year t or t+1 (Denis and Kruse, 2000).”
Executive Job Demands: New Insights for Explaining Strategic Decisions and Leader Behaviors (2005, background): “However, if the market for corporate control is efficient, then performance demands are sharply increased (Denis & Kruse, 2000).”
Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices (2005, background): “Hadlock and Lumer (1997) and Mikkelson and Partch (1997) suggest that the effectiveness of internal mechanisms depends on external control (complements) where as Denis and Kruse (2000) and Huson, Parrino and Starks (2001) suggest that effectiveness of internal monitoring is independent of external c”
Endogeneity and the corporate governance - performance relation (2010, background): “However, several authors, such as Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), Himmelberg et al. (1999), Denis and Kruse (2000) and Wintoki et al. (2008) argue that firm performance and corporate governance are simultaneously determined by unobservable firm-specific factors, and that governance changes are determi”
What Constrains or Facilitates Divestitures of Formerly Acquired Firms? The Effects of Organizational Inertia (2005, background): “…for such reasons as poor performance of the acquired unit (Johnson, 1996; Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1991), poor performance of the parent firm (Denis & Kruse, 2000; Duhaime & Grant, 1984), the desire to change the parent’s diversification strategy (Bergh, 1997; Hoskisson et al., 1994), and…”