Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing Companies

By Julian R. Franks, Colin Mayer, Luc Renneboog. 2001

319 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cb0f8043fbadc0aa4e96aae5a08f9520205e87f4

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Luc Renneboog
2. M. Martynova
3. M. Goergen
4. C. Vansteenkiste
5. D. Barako
6. Omesh Kini
7. V. Salas
8. R. Crespí

In Finance

1. D. Barako
2. Omesh Kini
3. Miguel A. García-Cestona
4. V. Salas
5. R. Crespí
6. William A. Kracaw
7. M. Martynova
8. C. Vansteenkiste

Citations in the corpus

• Why do public firms go private in the UK? The impact of private equity investors, incentive realignment and undervaluation (2007, background): “…effects of the incentive realignment hypothesis at higher levels of managerial ownership are contested because entrenchment effects may render management - even in the wake of poor performance - immune to board restructuring and may delay corporate restructuring (Franks et al., 2001).”
• The Determinants of Board Size and Composition: Evidence from the UK (2008, background): “This view is supported by UK evidence on the impact of outside directors, with no positive impact on either general firm performance (see e.g., Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998) or specific monitoring tasks (Cosh and Hughes, 1997; Franks et al., 2001).”
• Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of Institutional Investors: A Global Perspective (2003, unknown): “31One study that examines the monitoring role of different types of investors is Franks, Mayer, and Renneboog (2001), who find that there are differences across the monitoring parties and across countries.”
• The Nature of Discipline by Corporate Takeovers (2004, result): “We gather additional information regarding the tender offer and the target firm from the WSJI, DJI, SDC Global Mergers and Acquisitions 2 Although Franks, Mayer, and Renneboog (2001) attribute the divergence in governance outcomes to differences in regulations, these contrasting results may also be ”
• Failure and success in mergers and acquisitions (2019, background): “A small but important part of the market for corporate control comprises disciplinary takeovers of poorly performing or financially distressed firms (Franks, Mayer, and Renneboog, 2001).”
• Determinants of voluntary disclosures in Kenyan companies annual reports (2007, background): “They are viewed as providing the necessary checks and balances needed to enhance board effectiveness (Franks et al., 2001).”
• Corporate social reporting and board representation: evidence from the Kenyan banking sector (2008, background): “They are viewed as providing the necessary checks and balances needed to enhance board effectiveness ( Franks et al. 2001 ).”