Takeover Defenses at IPO Firms

By Laura Casares Field, Jonathan M. Karpoff. 2000

444 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/01b76888ee82025e0f1edebbead0430a7af05511

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Citations in the corpus

Litigation Risk, Strategic Disclosure and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings (2012, methodology): “from the Field-Ritter data set, as used in Field and Karpoff (2002) and Loughran and Ritter (2004). The VC dummy is equal to one if a firm is VC financed.”
Corporate Governance and Innovation: Theory and Evidence (2014, unknown): “One strand of the literature (the “quiet life” view) argues that laws that hinder the market for corporate control encourage managerial slack (Jensen (1988)). In contrast, another strand of the literature (the “managerial myopia” view) argues that strong antitakeover laws may foster innovation by fa”
Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview (2006, background): “13 Recently, papers by Daines and Klausner (2001), Field and Karpoff (2002), Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian (2003), and Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) have raised concerns about the use of antitakeover measures.”
Innovation, Appropriability, And The Underpricing Of Initial Public Offerings (2007, background): “Patent and Trademark Office patsic/coname database, which provides the date and assignee information for each utility patent.2 Firm assets, sales, and RD Loughran & Ritter, 2004).”
Board classification and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from the market for corporate control (2008, unknown): “10 As noted in Gordon (2002) the conditioned sample used in Bebchuk et al.”
Dual class IPOs: A theoretical analysis (2012, background): “See Field and Karpoff (2002) for a detailed listing. tions related to antitakeover provisions: What are the costs and benefits of incorporating various antitakeover provisions in a firm’s charter?”
Venture Capital and Corporate Governance in the Newly Public Firm (2012, unknown): “Similarly, Field and Karpoff (2002) find that many firms deploy takeover defenses at the time of IPO, and that this effect is particularly strong when oversight from nonmanagerial shareholders is weak.”
Shareholder Diversification and the Decision to Go Public (2008, unknown): “average of 18 (median of 8), as reported by Field and Karpoff (2002). The Review of Financial Studies / v 21 n 6 2008”
The Determinants of Corporate Board Size and Composition: An Empirical Analysis (2007, unknown): “The takeover defenses and state antitakeover laws are those defined and tracked by Field and Karpoff (2002). The rationale for free cash flow is provided by Jensen’s (1986) argument that free cash flow generates agency conflicts, as managers have incentives to use it for private benefits rather than”
A Law and Finance Analysis of Initial Public Offerings (2004, unknown): “%) are pure IPOs, i.e., did not involve previously listed firms or firms earlier owned by another listed firm, while 119 (34.8”
Local Underwriter Oligopolies and IPO Underpricing (2011, unknown): “…and Ritter (2004)) Thomson Financial’s SDC with corrections 36.5% 41.7% Age Calendar year of offering minus the calendar year of founding (Defined in Field and Karpoff (2002) and Appendix A of Loughran and Ritter (2004)) Jay Ritter’s web site 8 years (median) 7 years (median) Share overhang…”
Venture Capitalists, Business Angels, and Performance of Entrepreneurial IPOs in the UK and France (2007, unknown): “These provisions are even stronger when oversight from non-managerial shareholders is weak ( Field and Karpoff, 2002 ).”
Firm age and performance (2010, background): “Field and Karpoff’s (2002) results that large seasoned corporations deploy defenses at a higher rate than IPO firms would seem to be congruent.”