STEALTHMEM: System-Level Protection Against Cache-Based Side Channel Attacks in the Cloud

By Taesoo Kim, Marcus Peinado, Gloria Mainar-Ruiz. USENIX Security Symposium, 2012

403 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/008ff29ee4dbee79028e1017d6459347ad8f45d6

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Citations in the corpus

Last-Level Cache Side-Channel Attacks are Practical (2015, methodology): “STEALTHMEM [24] proposes a smarter way to utilize the page coloring technology by only reserving very few colors, known as stealth pages, for each physical core to store the security-sensitive code and data.”
Controlled-Channel Attacks: Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems (2015, background): “application level [21] or at the system level [32], [53].”
This Paper Is Included in the Proceedings of the 12th Usenix Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (osdi '16). Ryoan: a Distributed Sandbox for Untrusted Computation on Secret Data Ryoan: a Distributed Sandbox for Untrusted Computation on Secret Data (unknown): “Such channels are themselves technically difﬁcult and often require dedicated systems to address adequately [33, 35, 44, 49, 80].”
SgxPectre: Stealing Intel Secrets from SGX Enclaves Via Speculative Execution (2018, unknown): “System solutions only modify system software [42], [83], [49], [97], but as they require trusted system software, they cannot be directly applied to SGX.”
Fog computing security: a review of current applications and security solutions (2017, methodology): “Fog platforms used in this manner should include security solutions like Newcahe [114] and STEALTHMEM [115].”
High-Resolution Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems (2017, background): “Cache side channels have been known for a long time, and a variety of defenses has been designed against them [15, 17, 19, 21, 32, 43, 47], working at the hardware, hypervisor, OS or compiler level.”
A survey of microarchitectural timing attacks and countermeasures on contemporary hardware (2016, background): “StealthMem [92] implemented a limited form of colouring, providing a small amount of coloured memory that is guaranteed to not contend in the cache.”
Flush+Flush: A Fast and Stealthy Cache Attack (2015, background): “At the system level, page coloring provides cache isolation in software [19,34].”
InvisiSpec: Making Speculative Execution Invisible in the Cache Hierarchy (2018, background): “Other mechanisms, such as Catalyst [44] and StealthMem [45], prevent an attacker from observing a victim’s access patterns on a secure-sensitive region.”
CacheAudit: A Tool for the Static Analysis of Cache Side Channels (2013, methodology): “…on controlling the interactions between the software and the hardware layers, either through the operating system [Gullasch et al. 2011; Zhang et al. 2012a], the client application [Bernstein 2005; Osvik et al. 2006; Coppens et al. 2009], or both [Erlingsson and Abadi 2007; Kim et al. 2012].”
Raccoon: Closing Digital Side-Channels through Obfuscated Execution (2015, background): “08: : "=r" (result) 09: : "r" (pred), "r" (t_val), "r" (f_val) 10: : "cc" 11: ); 12: return result; 13: }”
CATalyst: Defeating last-level cache side channel attacks in cloud computing (2016, unknown): “Software based page coloring techniques [25, 27, 36] have also been proposed, but these are incompatible with superpages (without which performance will degrade for large workloads), and have some other issues that we will discuss later in Section 2 and Section 7.”
Cross-Tenant Side-Channel Attacks in PaaS Clouds (2014, background): “Various countermeasures to cache-based side channels (not necessarily Flush-Reload channels) have been proposed in IaaS cloud contexts [31, 4, 36, 18, 41, 19, 35].”
M2R: Enabling Stronger Privacy in MapReduce Computation (2015, methodology): “Both software and hardware-based solutions are emerging, but they are orthogonal to our techniques [18,29].”
SgxPectre Attacks: Leaking Enclave Secrets via Speculative Execution (2018, background): “cally effective, but are limited in that the time window required to have major processor vendors to incorporate them in commercial hardware is very long. System solutions only modify system software [40, 46, 75, 89], but as they require trusted system software, they cannot be directly applied to SG”
Translation Leak-aside Buffer: Defeating Cache Side-channel Protections with TLB Attacks (2018, background): “…a side-channel attack over shared TLBs that can extract secret information from a victim program protected with existing cache defenses [9, 21, 31, 37, 52, 62] Implementing TLBleed is challenging: due to the nature of TLB operations, we can only leak memory accesses in the coarse granularity…”