REVENUE SHARING AND VERTICAL CONTROL IN THE VIDEO RENTAL INDUSTRY
By Jr. and James D. Dana, K. Spier. 2003
332 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Information Systems, Marketing
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/008ac11795c46256208376a8634641003506657a
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
In Management Information Systems
- Gérard P. Cachon
- Justin P. Johnson
- Martin A. Lariviere
- Xuying Zhao
- Hal R. Varian
- Xuanming Su
- Ö. Özer
- Qi Feng
In Marketing
- Justin P. Johnson
- Gérard P. Cachon
- Hal R. Varian
- Martin A. Lariviere
- Xuying Zhao
- Alessandro Acquisti
- Gangshu (George) Cai
- Fouad El Ouardighi
Citations in the corpus
- Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations (2005, background): “10 In Dana and Spier’s (2001) setting with perfectly competitive price-setting retailers, a wholesale price does not coordinate the supply chain; revenue sharing is required.”
- Computer Mediated Transactions (2010, background): “There are counterexamples to the claim that " more information is better " such as the famous Hirshleifer (1971) example.”
- Competition and Coordination in Online Marketplaces (2012, background): “Dana and Spier (2001) consider revenue sharing in a supply chain in which a single supplier sells to multiple retailers, each of which is modeled as a newsvendor who must choose price and order quantity.”
- The Agency Model and MFN Clauses (2017, background): “The effect of revenue-sharing alone has been investigated both in the economics and operations research literatures (for example, Mathewson and Winter (1985), Dana and Spier (2001), Cachon and Lariviere (2005), and Krishnan, Kapuscinski, and Butz (2004)).”
- Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts (2003, background): “Dana and Spier (2001) study these contracts in the context of a perfectly competitive retail market. Pasternack (1999) studies a single retailer newsvendor model in which the retailer can purchase some units with revenue sharing and other units with a wholesale price contract.”