Raids, Rewards, and Reputations in the Market for Managerial Talent

By C. Fee, Charles J. Hadlock. 2003

357 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/006e965c14221b973782e1e0be14b71a8faf5627

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Citations in the corpus

Managerial Ability, Investment Efficiency and Stock Price Crash Risk (2017, unknown): “…also use an expanded version of equation (1) whereby we estimate the following model incorporating the differential predictability for revenue increases and revenue decreases in order to determine the magnitude of over (under)-investment (Eberly 1997; McNichols and Stubben 2008, Chen et al., 2011).”
Peer Choice in CEO Compensation (2012, unknown): “The first construct, abnormal performance, is based on the idea that CEOs who have historically produced greater abnormal performance are more talented (see Carter et al., 2010; Chang et al., 2010; Fee and Hadlock, 2003; and Rajgopal et al., 2006).”
Readability of Narrative Disclosures in 10-K Reports: Does Managerial Ability Matter? (2018, unknown): “In the sensitivity analysis, we follow prior studies in using industry-adjusted value-weighted stock returns as an alternative specification of managerial ability (e.g. Fee & Hadlock, 2003; Milbourn, 2003; Rajgopal, Shevlin, & Zamora, 2006).”
Managers with and without Style: Evidence Using Exogenous Variation (2013, background): “Outside CEOs who have led other firms tend to come from smaller, high-performing firms (Fee and Hadlock (2003)), and it is generally bad news to lose a top executive to another firm (Hayes and Schaefer (1999)).”
Generalists versus specialists: Lifetime work experience and chief executive officer pay (2013, background): “Boards are more likely to hire executives from high-performing firms, and boards pay a premium for this performance (Fee and Hadlock, 2003).”
Managerial Ability and Earnings Quality (2013, methodology): “Historical returns are significantly larger among high quality managers, consistent with Fee and Hadlock (2003) and”
Quantifying Managerial Ability: A New Measure and Validity Tests (2012, methodology): “Finally, several studies have used executive pay to infer managerial ability, either directly (e.g., Tervio 2008; Carter et al. 2010) or to corroborate their measures of ability (e.g., Fee and Hadlock 2003).”
Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives (2010, background): “Fee and Hadlock (2003) study a sample of managers who were hired from outside to either the CEO position or a senior non-CEO managerial role. They report that the prior employers of outside CEOs tended to have above-average stock price performance prior to the manager’s departure, as measured by sto”
Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives (2016, background): “However, we focus exclusively on explicit financial incentives and do not consider the role of implicit incentives resulting from the managerial labor market (Gibbons and Murphy 1992; Fee and Hadlock 2003; Coles, Li, and Wang 2018; Cziraki and Jenter 2021).”
Industry Tournament Incentives (2018, unknown): “Fee and Hadlock (2003) find that executives who jump to CEO positions at new employers come from firms that exhibit above average stock price performance.”
Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation (2008, unknown): “In the few cases in which departing CEOs find new executive positions, it appears that these CEOs are moving to more prestigious jobs and retention would have been costly (e.g., see Fee and Hadlock, 2003).”