A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation

By V. Acharya. 2009

942 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ec5fff78fde3f824ecfdb620bcecd182fd2d4609

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Citations in the corpus

Outside and Inside Liquidity (2009, neutral): “Subsequently, Acharya (2001) and Acharya and Yorulmazer (2005) have, in turn, introduced optimal bailout policies in a model with multiple banks and cash-in-the-market pricing of loans in the interbank market.”
Caught between Scylla and Charybdis? Regulating Bank Leverage When There is Rent-Seeking and Risk-Shifting (2015, neutral): “See also Acharya (2009).”
Reputational Contagion and Optimal Regulatory Forbearance (2013, methodology): “For an example of such a model, see Acharya (2001).”
Towards a Macroprudential Framework for Financial Supervision and Regulation? (2003, positive): “Acharya (2001) focuses on common exposures and the asset side of balance sheets.”
The Financial Trilemma (2011, background): “In a similar vein, Acharya (2009) defines a financial crisis as systemic if many banks fail together, or if one bank's failure propagates as a contagion causing the failure of many banks (see also Allen and Gale, 2000 on contagion). In Acharya's model, the joint failure of banks arises from correlat”
Inside and Outside Liquidity (2008, background): “Subsequently, Acharya (2001) and Acharya and Yorulmazer (2005) have, in turn, introduced optimal bailout policies in a model with multiple banks and cash-in-the-market pricing of loans in the interbank market.”
Bubbles, Financial Crises, and Systemic Risk (2012, neutral): “In addition, Acharya (2009), Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007, 2008) , and Farhi and Tirole (2012) point out that if financial institutions expect authorities to”
The institutional memory hypothesis and the procyclicality of bank lending behavior (2002, positive): “Similarly, bank managers may choose herding or assume correlated risks in order to avoid the costs of separating themselves from their peers (e.g., Devenow and Welch 1996, Acharya 2001).”
Macroprudential Policy - A Literature Review (2012, positive): “Acharya, 2009). Important elements within this perspective include market failures (e.g. Rabin, 1998; Calomiris, 2009) and propagation channels (e.g. Jensen, 1986; Calomiris and Khan, 1991). Most of the macroprudential tools discussed pertain to the regulation of banks’ capital. At the same time, th”
Systemic Risk and Deposit Insurance Premiums (2009, background): “One possibility, as Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008) argue, is to use taxpayer funds, not to guarantee bank debt, but to make transfers to healthier institutions and enable the institutions to acquire failed banks at higher costs than they would using only private funds.”
Back to the Basics in Banking? A Micro-Analysis of Banking System Stability (2009, neutral): “Combining equations ( 1 ), (4), and (5) allows computing the extreme systematic risk measure, tail-�:”