Elliot Anshelevich

Management Science and Operations Research · 2003–2004

A researcher in the Science corpus: 2 papers; trusts 3 researchers and is trusted by 1 researcher here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Subfields

Whom Elliot Anshelevich trusts overall

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

  1. Dov Monderer
  2. Tim Roughgarden
  3. Christos H. Papadimitriou
  4. Adrian R. Vetta
  5. Lloyd S. Shapley
  6. Uriel Feige
  7. Artur Czumaj
  8. Venkatesh Bala
  9. Frank P. Kelly
  10. José R. Correa

Who trusts Elliot Anshelevich overall

  1. George Christodoulou
  2. É. Tardos
  3. Elias Koutsoupias
  4. Tim Roughgarden
  5. Christos H. Papadimitriou

Papers from Elliot Anshelevich's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers Elliot Anshelevich trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

  1. On a network creation game (ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing)
  2. Charging and rate control for elastic traffic
  3. The complexity of pure Nash equilibria (Symposium on the Theory of Computing)
  4. Nash equilibria in competitive societies, with applications to facility location, traffic routing and auctions (The 43rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2002. Proceedings.)
  5. The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology (Symposium on the Theory of Computing)
  6. The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow (Symposium on the Theory of Computing)
  7. Algorithmic Mechanism Design (Games Econ. Behav.)
  8. A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation
  9. Variations on the shapley value
  10. Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks (Mathematics of Operations Research)

Their papers