Algorithmic Mechanism Design

By Noam Nisan, Amir Ronen. Games Econ. Behav., 2001

705 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/59f98fbf6acba04757836ff845b616a806a479d0

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. É. Tardos
2. Tim Roughgarden
3. Jon M. Kleinberg
4. Anirban Dasgupta
5. Elliot Anshelevich
6. Tom Wexler
7. John Chung-I Chuang
8. Michal Feldman

In Marketing

1. Amir Ronen
2. Tim Roughgarden
3. Noam Nisan
4. Jean-Pierre Hubaux

Citations in the corpus

• Game theory meets network security and privacy (2013, background): “Furthermore, the theory of mecha­nism design [Nisan and Ronen 1999; Nisan 2007] has enabled researchers to design security and privacy mechanisms based on the analytical results obtained (e.g., equi­librium analysis of the game).”
• A game-theoretic method of fair resource allocation for cloud computing services (2010, background): “The resource allocation problem considered in paper has been studied by Nisan and Ronen in [26, 27], where it was shown that the approximation ratio of mechanisms is between 2 and n.”
• Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy (2007, neutral): “Algorithmic mechanism design, starting with the work of Nisan and Ronen [32], has mostly concentrated on designing truthful mechanisms.”
• Overcoming free-riding behavior in peer-to-peer systems (2005, background): “To that end, Nisan and Ronen [Nisan and Ronen, 1999] have introduced the no­tion of algorithmic mechanism design (AMD), which creates a formal model of centralized computation that combines incentive compatibility and computational tractability.”
• The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation (2004, background): “Indeed, one can view the activity of a protocol designer seeking a good Nash equilibrium as being aligned with the general goals of mechanism design [33] — producing a game that yields good outcomes when players act in their own self-interest.”
• Towards Sharp Inapproximability For Any 2-CSP (2007, neutral): “Algorithmic mechanism design, starting with the work of Nisan and Ronen [32], has mostly concentrated on designing truthful mechanisms.”
• Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms (2000, background): “allocation problems [ 16 , 27, 26, 10, 3]. For many of these applications the”