The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation

1,002 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Computing correlated equilibria in multi-player games (2005, background): “In the more general network design game from [1], players choose paths in a graph to connect their terminals (we assume here that the paths are given explicitly in the input so that the game has polynomial type), and the cost of each edge is shared equally among the players who included it in their ”
The price of anarchy of finite congestion games (2005, methodology): “The techniques were also helpful to bound the price of stability (the optimistic price of anarchy of the best Nash equilibrium as opposed to the worst Nash equilibrium [2]).”
Selfish routing and the price of anarchy (2005, background): “A second example is the recent work by Chen, Roughgarden, and Valiant [15] that analyzes how the price of stability in a class of network design games [3] depends on the choice of an underlying cost-sharing protocol.”
Handbook of Computational Social Choice (2016, background): “(2011); the concept is inspired by the price of stability (Anshelevich et al., 2004).”
Designing games for distributed optimization (2011, background): “, the wonderful life utility [5], [8] and the Shapley value utility [17], [18], prescribe procedures for deriving agent objective functions from a given system level objective function.”