A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation
By Venkatesh Bala, Sanjeev Goyal. 2000
1,561 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1011355e4ec87a0857f1f3873ad0736406659a42
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Matthew O. Jackson
- Michael Kosfeld
- É. Tardos
- Martin A. Nowak
- O. Baetz
- Asuman E. Ozdaglar
- Daron Acemoglu
- Christian E. G. Steglich
In Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
- Matthew O. Jackson
- Christian E. G. Steglich
- Marcel Fafchamps
- Tom A. B. Snijders
- Vincent Buskens
- A. van de Rijt
- Martin A. Nowak
- Michael Schweinberger
Citations in the corpus
- Networks in Production: Asset Pricing Implications (2017, neutral): “In recent set of studies endogenous network formation results in a network with a core-periphery structure when agents choose their connections unilaterally (Bala and Goyal (2000), Galeotti and Goyal (2010)).”
- Risk-Sharing and Endogenous Network Formation (2002, background): “Bala and Goyal (2000) theoretically model network formation as a non-cooperative game.”
- Evolutionary games on graphs (2006, methodology): “of partners play an important role in the emergence of cooperation. Several aspects of this process have been investigated by using different dynamics in the mathematical models (Ashlock et al., 1996; Bala and Goyal, 2000; Hanaki et al., 2006) and experimentally [see (Hauk and Nagel, 2001; Coricelli ”
- Social Capital and Economic Performance: Analytics* (2002, background): “37 In a fundamental paper, Bala and Goyal (2000) have modelled network formation as an equilibrium of a game in which people establishing the networks bear the cost of installation.”
- Cooperation Prevails When Individuals Adjust Their Social Ties (2006, background): “The fact that in our model cooperators and defectors interact via social ties they both decide upon establishes a coupling between individual strategy and population structure: the game payoff induces now an entangled co-evolution of strategy and structure (for different approaches specific to the P”
- Evolutionary dynamics on graphs (2005, background): “? Furthermore, how does the graph itself change as a consequence of evolutionary dynamic”
- Economic Networks in the Laboratory: A Survey (2004, methodology): “The experiment of Callander and Plott (2003) is inspired by the network-formation model of Bala and Goyal (2000a). The authors, however, only consider the 1-way flow model and in this model only those treatments where the circle is the unique efficient strict Nash network. Falk and Kosfeld (2003) pr”
- Network formation and social coordination (2005, background): “1 See, e.g., Allen and Gale (2000), Bala and Goyal (1998), Chwe (2000), Coleman (1966), Ellison and Fudenberg (1993), Ellison (1993), Granovetter (1974), Haag and Lagunoff (2000), and Morris (2000), among others.”