Ownership and Control of German Corporations

By Julian R. Franks, Colin Mayer. 2001

628 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fffaa10dd2ef690212524e829e303ce4302eca22

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate Governance in Germany: An Economic Perspective (2003, neutral): “As Franks and Mayer (2001) report, this market is active and at times quite hostile to incumbent management.”
Family ownership, financing constraints and investment decisions (2011, neutral): “Franks and Mayer (2001) observe that ‘85% of the largest quoted companies have a single shareholder owning more than 25% of the voting shares’ (based on 171 companies in 1990).”
Are OECD-prescribed “good corporate governance practices” really good in an emerging economy? (2011, background): “Another important difference between SBs in Germany and in China is that most members in the German SBs usually hold either crucial senior positions within firms or important external positions (e.g., executives in a firm’s major bank creditor) (Franks & Mayer, 2001; Franks et al., 2006).”
A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business Groups (2005, neutral): “Graham and Dodd (1934) argue that the ability to use the resources of an already established Þrm to set up or acquire new Þrms was one of the reasons for the existence of pyramids in the U.”
Corporate Governance: What’s Special About Banks? (2013, background): “Banks are also major creditors to the real economy, even sitting on corporate boards in their capacity as major investors in countries such as Germany and Japan (Gorton & Schmid 2000, Franks & Mayer 2001, Yafeh & Yosha 2003).”
One Share, One Vote: The Empirical Evidence (2007, neutral): “This is also consistent with the evidence in Franks and Mayer (2001), who find only limited evidence that pyramids are used for control purposes in German corporations.15 Summary of the Evidence Concerning Determinants of Ownership Structures Few papers directly tackle the issue of the determinants…”
Family control and investment–cash flow sensitivity: Empirical evidence from the Euro zone (2011, neutral): “, Western Europe or East Asia (see, for instance, Mok, Lam and Cheung, 1992; Lam, Mok, Cheung and Yam, 1994; Bhattacharya and Ravikumar, 2001; Franks and Mayer, 2001; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Gadhoum, Lang and Young, 2005).”
Real Earnings Management and Accrual-based Earnings Management in Family Firms (2014, background): “Franks and Mayer (2001), for example, examine the levels of ownership concentration in German firms in 1990, and find that founding families represent the largest shareholder, owning more than 25% of the shares and more than 50% of voting rights. As another example, Goergen and Renneboog (1999) inve”