Competitive Insurance Markets with Two Unobservables

By M. Smart. 2000

121 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market (2004, background): “It is straightforward, however, as Smart (2000) points out, to generalize these models to allow for a multi-dimensional vector of insurance product characteristics.”
Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets (2000, result): “In a companion paper, Smart (1998) obtains similar results.”
Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case (2006, background): “Landsberger and Meilijson (1994) studied competitive insurance markets when adverse selection bears on the insurees’ risk-aversion; Smart (2000) and Villeneuve (2003) extended their analysis to two-dimensional adverse selection, where both risk-aversion and risk are privately known by the insuree.”
The Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market (2007, unknown): “Various recent papers have made progress on this front (Smart, 2000; Wambach, 2000; de Meza and Webb, 2001; and Jullien, Salanie, and Salanie, 2007).”
Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market. (2006, background): “…between insurance coverage and risk occurrence may be neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the presence of asymmetric information about risk type (Michael Smart, 2000; Achim Wambach, 2000; David de Meza and David C. Webb, 2001; Bruno Jullien et al., 2002; Chiappori et al., forthcoming).”