Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market
By Amy N. Finkelstein, J. Poterba. Journal of Political Economy, 2004
635 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics, General Health Professions
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2eb7461886668457f024104144d579d688e7943f
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Demography
- Paula Lopes
- Alexander Michaelides
- J. Inkmann
- Alma Cohen
- Raj Chetty
- Peter Siegelman
- Amy N. Finkelstein
- Anthony Saunders
In Economics and Econometrics
- Amy N. Finkelstein
- Raj Chetty
- Peter Siegelman
- Alma Cohen
- Alexander Michaelides
- Paula Lopes
- J. Inkmann
- Richard G. Newell
In General Health Professions
- Raj Chetty
- Alma Cohen
- Paula Lopes
- Alexander Michaelides
- J. Inkmann
- Peter Siegelman
- Amy N. Finkelstein
- Anthony Saunders
Citations in the corpus
- The Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market (2007, neutral): “First, adverse selection has already been detected and documented in this market along the choice of guarantee period, with private information about longevity a¤ecting both the choice of contract and its price in equilibrium (Finkelstein and Poterba, 2004 and 2006).”
- Imperfect Competition in Selection Markets (2017, background): “Building on Chiappori and Salanié (2000), a growing literature estimates the correlation between demand and marginal costs in a range of selection markets (e.g., Finkelstein & Poterba, 2004; Bundorf, Levin, & Mahoney, 2012).”
- Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets (2010, positive): “Two recent studies by Finkelstein and Poterba (2002, 2004) and one by McCarthy and Mitchell (forthcoming) find evidence of an information asymmetry in favor of annuitants.”
- What Determines Annuity Demand at Retirement? (2012, neutral): “57 See Mitchell et al. (1999) and Brown et al. (2001) for the U.S., Cannon and Tonks (2004, 2008) and Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) for the U.K., Guazzarotti and Tommasino (2008) for Italy.”
- The total costs of corporate borrowing in the loan market: Don't ignore the fees (2015, positive): “The positive correlation test does not allow to distinguish between the hypotheses of fees being used as a screening device versus that of fees being used to alter borrowers' incentives expost (Finkelstein and Poterba (2004), Finkelstein and McGarry (2006)).”
- Social Insurance: Connecting Theory to Data (2012, background): “As a result, evidence of a positive correlation between annuitization and survival can be interpreted as clear evidence of adverse selection in this market (Finkelstein & Poterba, 2004).”
- Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans (2014, neutral): “75 Finkelstein and Poterba (2002, 2004).”
- How Deep is the Annuity Market Participation Puzzle (2007, methodology): “…the factors a¤ecting the participation decision can potentially help us quantify the magnitude of the puzzle relative to the predictions from di¤erent models 4See, for instance, Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky and Brown (1999) for the U.S. and Finkelstein and Poterba (2002, 2004) for U.K..”
- Selection Effects in the United Kingdom Individual Annuities Market (2002, background): “In Finkelstein and Poterba (2000), however, we use data from individual annuity purchases to show that there are mortality differentials across the individuals who buy different products.”