TESTING ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES IN THE FIELD: THREAT, MORAL APPEAL AND SOCIAL INFORMATION

By G. Fellner, Rupert Sausgruber, Christian Traxler. 2013

373 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/80f083d208e3135e1c9ce31d405282afab228e87

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Citations in the corpus

The Behavioralist as Tax Collector: Using Natural Field Experiments to Enhance Tax Compliance (2017, background): “As noted above, the effect size that Fellner et al. (2013) find for the mere receipt of a letter is very similar to the one obtained in our study.”
Requiem for a Nudge: Framing effects in nudging honesty (2020, result): “…we observe a higher rate of lying overall, which is in line with the literature on motivated misremembering and belief distortion, among others (e.g., Carlson et al., 2018; Exley and Kessler, 2018; Gneezy et al., 2018b; Zimmermann, 2019; Bicchieri et al., 2019b; Saucet and Villeval, 2019 ).”
Norm Perception as a Vehicle for Social Change (2016, background): “It can be difficult to persuade individuals to comply with a norm if they actively oppose it (Costa & Kahn, 2013; Fellner et al., 2013).”
Taking State-Capacity Research to the Field: Insights from Collaborations with Tax Authorities (2019, neutral): “…Wenzel and Taylor (2004), Wenzel (2005, 2006), Hasseldine et al. (2007), Iyer et al. (2010), Kleven et al. (2011), Ariel (2012), Del Carpio (2013), Fellner et al. (2013), Ortega and Sanguinetti (2013), Harju et al. (2014), Bhargava and Manoli (2015), Castro and Scartascini (2015), Kosonen and…”
How effective is nudging? A quantitative review on the effect sizes and limits of empirical nudging studies (2019, background): “Moreover, although not being part of the morphological box, some studies foreshadow moderating effects on the effectiveness of nudging, such as political preferences (e.g. Fellner et al., 2013) or personality (Stutzer et al., 2011; Jung and Mellers, 2016).”
From the Lab to the Field: A Review of Tax Experiments (2016, background): “Even the dependent variable, compliance, is often measured in different ways, in terms of outstanding payments (Hallsworth et al., 2017), as new registrations (Fellner et al., 2013), or as increases in reported income (Slemrod et al., 2001).”
How to Improve Tax Compliance? Evidence from Population-Wide Experiments in Belgium (2019, background): “Troiano 2018), while several other experiments testing normative appeals have found null or even negative results (e.g., Blumenthal et al. 2001; Fellner, Sausgruber, and Traxler 2013; John and Blume 2018; Cranor et al. 2020).5 Third, we ran four population-wide randomized field experiments that…”
Tax Compliance and Enforcement in the Pampas: Evidence from a Field Experiment (2013, methodology): “…was carried out on a property-based tax, whereas the previous literature focused on income taxes (e.g., Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian, 2001; Blumenthal, Christian, and Slemrod, 2001; Kleven et al., 2011), VAT (Pomeranz, 2013), or very specific fees (Fellner, Sausgruber, and Traxler, 2013).”
On the External Validity of Laboratory Tax Compliance Experiments (2015, neutral): “One of the first of these field experiments was by Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian (2001); more recent examples include Iyer, Reckers, and Sanders (2010), Kleven et al. (2011), Fellner, Sausgruber, and Traxler (2011), Pomeranz (2013), and Castro and Scartascini (2013), and Bott et al. (2013).”
Evidence of the invisible: toward a credibility revolution in the empirical analysis of tax evasion and the informal economy (2012, neutral): “Fellner et al. (2009) set up a randomized field study in collaboration with the Fee Information Service in Austria to study a different type of evasion, namely whether individuals register and thus pay for receiving public broadcasting, which is required by law.”
No Taxation Without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax (2015, neutral): “For example, Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2014) find that moral suasion can increase cooperation in the lab, especially when coupled with deterrence, and Fellner, Sausgruber, and Traxler (2013) find that social norm letters increase compliance with broadcast tax obligations for those who live in regions with…”