Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence From a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark

By H. Kleven, Marte Knudsen, C. Kreiner, Søren Pedersen, Emmanuel Saez. 2011

1,138 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/832080dc69855cfd749e6ef6f79223939361272a

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Citations in the corpus

Tax Bunching, Income Shifting and Self-employment (2013, methodology): “Kleven et al. (2011) compare incomes before and after the auditing by the Danish tax authorities.”
From the Lab to the Field: A Review of Tax Experiments (2016, positive): “Still, studies that can make a concrete threat of an imminent audit (as in Kleven et al., 2011; or Slemrod et al., 2001) find a larger treatment effect than those using more hypothetical statements (Castro and Scartascini, 2013).”
Tax Morale and Compliance Behavior: First Evidence on a Causal Link (2012, background): “1Kleven et al. (2011) demonstrate that the ability to cheat (i.”
WHAT MOTIVATES TAX COMPLIANCE? (2018, neutral): “See Kleven et al. (2011) and Pomeranz (2015) for important recent applications.25 However, researchers have become increasingly skeptical about the ability of most all forms of naturally occurring field data to achieve identification of the causal effects of policies (Angrist and Pischke, 2010).”
The effect of tax enforcement on tax morale (2013, positive): “…that the higher level of evasion of self-employed is not only shaped by the fact that their income is not third-party reported, as suggested by Kleven et al. (2011), but (potentially) also by a lower tax morale.16 Our general results are also supported by several robustness checks meant to…”
Consumers as Tax Auditors (2019, methodology): “Similarly to Kleven et al. (2011), I assume that the audit probability is increasing in the amount evaded, and that the probability governments detect evasion is a product of government audits and the likelihood that the government will uncover evasion by taxpayers during an audit.”
On the External Validity of Laboratory Tax Compliance Experiments (2015, neutral): “One of the first of these field experiments was by Slemrod, Blumenthal, and Christian (2001); more recent examples include Iyer, Reckers, and Sanders (2010), Kleven et al. (2011), Fellner, Sausgruber, and Traxler (2011), Pomeranz (2013), and Castro and Scartascini (2013), and Bott et al. (2013).”
The Behavioralist as Tax Collector: Using Natural Field Experiments to Enhance Tax Compliance (2017, methodology): “…have been employed to test the AS model; notably, recent years have seen a surge in the use of field experiments (Blumenthal et al., 2001; Kleven et al., 2011; Ariel, 2012; Del Carpio, 2013; Carrillo et al., 2014; Gangl et al., 2014; Bott et al., 2014; Pomeranz, 2015; Castro &…”
Using Notches to Uncover Optimization Frictions and Structural Elasticities: Theory and Evidence from Pakistan* (2013, background): “Theoretically, the evasion response to tax rate changes depends on the curvature–not the level–of detection probabilities and penalties as a function of evasion (Kleven et al. 2011), and even the sign of the effect is in general ambiguous.”
Notching R&D Investment with Corporate Income Tax Cuts in China (2018, result): “As in other settings (e.g., Kleven et al., 2011), this type of third-party reporting limits the degree to which firms can completely make up “phantom” R&D expenses.”
Outsider Oversight: Designing a Third Party Audit Ecosystem for AI Governance (2022, background): “When an individual’s income is reported to the IRS by third parties like banks and employers, for example, that individual is far more likely to be tax compliant than if they self-reported their income [71, 84].”