Influence and Inefficiency in the Internal Capital Market: Theory and Evidence

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Market Discipline and Incentive Problems in Conglomerate Firms with Applications to Banking (2000, background): “Rajan and Zingales (1999) and Wulf (1998) address the adverse consequences of power struggles and influence costs on the allocation of capital within firms.”
Corporate capital allocation: a behavioral perspective (2011, background): “Their model assumes that if there is less competition for resources among those divisions, then division managers are more likely to favor investments that enhance the profits of not only their own division but also other divisions (for similar models, see Wulf, 2005; Bernardo, Luo, and Wang, 2006).”
The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment (2000, unknown): “These ideas have been separately explored in Fulghieri and Hodrick (1997), Scharfstein and Stein (1997), and Wulf (1997).”
Does Diversification Destroy Value? Evidence From Industry Shocks (2000, unknown): “For more on the possible benefits of diversity, see Fulghieri and Hodrick (1997), Stein Does diversification destroy value?”