Market Discipline and Incentive Problems in Conglomerate Firms with Applications to Banking

By Arnoud Boot, A. Schmeits. 2000

207 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3b67d115dcd6691cbe98a1ba37c402d5c3d0166d

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Citations in the corpus

Bank governance, regulation, supervision, and risk reporting: Evidence from operational risk disclosures in European banks (2013, background): “Literature also showed that banks disclosing more comprehensive risk information choose a higher capital buffer and lower default risk (Boot & Schmeits, 2000; Cordella & Yeyati, 1998; Nier & Baumann, 2006).”
Internal Capital Markets and Corporate Refocusing (2002, background): “The basic idea has been extended to allow for various costs of coinsurance arising from debt overhang problems (John, 1993), free cash f ow problems (Li and Li, 1996), and asset substitution (risk) problems (Boot and Schmeits, 2000).”
Is financial inclusion good for bank stability? International evidence (2017, background): “Moreover, according to portfolio theory, diversified banks can decrease earning volatility and adverse risk-taking incentives through cross-subsidisation (Boot and Schmeits, 2000).”
The Effects of Focus versus Diversification on Bank Performance: Evidence from Chinese Banks (2010, background): “monitors of borrowers (see Diamond (1984), Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), and Boyd and Prescott (1986)). On the other hand, some studies (see Jensen (1986), Berger and Ofek (1996), Servaes (1996), and Denis et al.”
Who Disciplines Bank Managers? (2009, unknown): “See, for example, Boot and Schmeits (2000) for a further discussion of this terminology.”
The extent of disclosure in annual reports of banking companies: The case of India (2008, background): “Cordella and Yeyati (1998) and Boot and Schmeits (2000), pointed to the commitment effect of bank disclosure.”