Does Diversification Destroy Value? Evidence From Industry Shocks

By O. Lamont, Christopher Polk. 2000

296 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2cfcd40d38be10078160e450fb35fc25e07ddb5c

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Citations in the corpus

Does Corporate International Diversification Destroy Value? Evidence from Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions (2008, unknown): “8 For further evidence on endogeneity and the industrial diversification discount, see Hyland and Diltz (2002) and Lamont and Polk (2002).”
Spin-Offs, Divestitures, and Conglomerate Investment (2007, background): “Recent interest in this general area begins with Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995), who document that diversified”
Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches (2005, unknown): “Since many panel data sets have more firms than years, a common approach is to include dummy variables for each time period (to absorb the time effect) and then cluster by firm (Lamont and Polk, 2001; Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Gross and Souleles, 2004; Sapienza, 2004; and Faulkender and Petersen, 200”
The Determinants of Positive Long-Term Performance in Strategic Mergers: Corporate Focus and Cash (2004, unknown): “Loughran and Vijh (1997) find that long-run stock price performance is better for cash acquirers than stock acquirers. Ghosh (2001) and Linn and Switzer (2001) find the same relationship for long-term operating performance.”
Corporate diversification and shareholder value: a survey of recent literature (2003, background): “Lamont and Polk (1999) examine the hypothesis that the diversification discount is simply a rational reflection of differences in expected returns and cash flows of diversified versus focused firms.”
Optimal Diversification: Reconciling Theory and Evidence (2004, background): “Given our measures of capital, labor and output and assuming that each activity corresponds to one plant we can easily estimate (15-17).”
Creditor rights and corporate risk-taking (2009, unknown): “…Berger and Ofek (1995) find that conglomerates overinvest in segments whose industry has poor investment opportunity, and Lamont (1997), Scharfstein (1998), Shin and Stulz (1998), Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) and Lamont and Polk (2002) find evidence of inefficient investment in conglomerates.”
Capital Market Development, International Integration, Legal Systems, and the Value of Corporate Diversification: A Cross-Country Analysis (2003, background): “Some evidence suggests that for U.S. firms, diversification reduces value (e.g., Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), John and Ofek (1995), Comment and Jarrell (1995), and Lamont and Polk (2002)).”
Divisional diversity and the conglomerate discount: evidence from spinoffs (2003, methodology): “Further evidence on the diversity cost hypothesis is provided by Lamont and Polk (2002), whose paper is perhaps the closest to ours in spirit.”
Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market's Reaction (2008, unknown): “The index, based on logit estimates from Kaplan and Zingales (1997), is defined as KZit ¼ 1:001909 CFit Kit 1 þ 0:2826389 Qit þ 3:139193 Levit 39:3678 Divit Kit 1 1:314759 Cit Kit 1 28 See, e.g., Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Servaes (1996), and Lamont and Polk (2002).”
Internal Capital Markets in Business Groups: Evidence from the Asian Financial Crisis (2014, unknown): “In a similar context, Rajan et al. (2000), Lamont and Polk (2002), and Billett and Mauer (2003) report that the ‘corporate socialism’ is more severe for conglomerates with more diverse quality of investment opportunities across divisions.”
The Effects of Focus versus Diversification on Bank Performance: Evidence from Chinese Banks (2010, result): “For example, while many studies provide evidence that conglomerates perform more poorly than specialized firms (e.g., Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Lamont and Polk (2002)), other studies support the opposite conclusion.”