Thinking like a game theorist: factors affecting the frequency of equilibrium play

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The promise of Mechanical Turk: how online labor markets can help theorists run behavioral experiments. (2012, background): “A solution is to add additional incentives, such that subjects are paid extra if their reported beliefs are correct (Blanco et al., 2010; Croson, 2000; G ¨ achter and Renner, 2010; Prelec, 2004).”
Decomposing trust and trustworthiness (2006, background): “There is general agreement that subjects are more likely to take their counterpart’s incentives into account when beliefs are elicited than when making action choices only (e.g., Croson, 2000, Costas-Gomez and Weizs¨ acker, 2003).”
Leaders as role models and ‘belief managers’ in social dilemmas (2018, background): “In line with this evidence Cowell (1990) argues: "a person’s propensity to dodge taxes seems to be strongly affected by the number of other people who are already doing the same" (p. 108).”
Pro-social behavior in a natural setting (2004, background): “Even the very fact of asking people to think about what others do changes their behavior (Croson, 2000).”
A stress test of fairness measures in models of social utility (2005, background): “For 9 Eliciting beliefs before the game is played can change the way the game is played (e.g., Croson, 2000).”
Eliciting beliefs: Proper scoring rules, incentives, stakes and hedging (2010, background): “11See e.g. Croson (2000), Gachter and Renner (2010), or Fischbacher and Gachter (2010).”