Family ownership and productivity: the role of owner-management

By Erling Barth, T. Gulbrandsen, Pål Schønea. 2005

371 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fb79c43ca3640be794bb0656b14c24f9b849bd68

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In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Citations in the corpus

Owner‐Management, Firm Age, and Productivity in Italian Family Firms (2014, background): “…with previous studies on efficiency in family firms that show that family run firms perform worse than non-family managed firms: however, our findings show that, in the case of Italy, the productivity gap is narrower than that observed in other cases (Barth et al., 2005 for the Norwegian case).”
Influence of Family Involvement in Management and Ownership on Firm Performance: Evidence From Poland (2010, background): “For example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) consider a firm to be a family firm if a controlling shareholder has direct and indirect voting rights exceeding 20%, whereas Barth, Gulbrandsen, and Schone (2005) use 33% of share ownership as a cutoff point to define a family firm.”
The Global Financial Crisis, Family Control, and Dividend Policy: The Global Financial Crisis, Family Control, and Dividend Policy (2016, positive): “On the other hand, prior empirical evidence (e.g., Claessens et al., 2002; Fan and Wong, 2002; Barth, Gulbrandsen, and Schone, 2005; Attig et al., 2006; Boubakri.”
Institutional Distance and Foreign Subsidiary Performance in Emerging Markets: Moderating Effects of Ownership Strategy and Host-Country Experience (2016, neutral): “Existing literature shows that the board and ownership structure can have implications for ﬁrm performance (Barth et al. 2005; Core et al. 1999); therefore, we include the number of directors on the board and whether the subsidiary is a publicly listed ﬁrm as control variables.”
How do managerial successions shape corporate financial policies in family firms (2011, background): “…an inferior decision in terms of managerial talent (Perez-Gonzales, 2006), inducing lower performance (Villalonga and Amit, 2006) and productivity (Barth et al., 2005).1 Motivated by such arguments, a growing literature compares the impact of incoming family heirs and professional CEOs on firm…”
Corporate Governance, External Market Discipline and Firm Productivity (2011, neutral): “The exceptions are Hill and Snell (1989), Palia and Lichtenberg (1999), and Barth et al. (2005) who utilized total factor productivity in considering the influence of ownership structure on firm performance.”
Are Family Firms Good Employers (2017, background): “In conjunction with recent arguments from the family business (Chrisman et al., 2017; Cucculelli, Mannarino, Pupo, & Ricotta, 2014) and finance (Barth et al., 2005; Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003) literatures, we suggest that these problems are particularly severe in family firms.”
Family firms and firm performance: Evidence from Japan (2008, positive): “Barth et al. (2004) show that in Norway, family firms owned and managed by the founding family are less productive than nonfamily firms. More recent studies indicate the importance of the generation of the family management and family structure in family firms. Villalonga and Amit (2006) examine the”
Does family business excel in firm performance? An institution-based view (2012, background): “For example, when compared with family firms managed by outside CEOs, firms managed by family CEOs have been found to be more productive (Durand & Vargas, 2003), less productive ( Barth et al., 2005; Westhead & Howorth, 2006), or equally productive (Barontini & Caprio, 2006) in different research c”